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SOVEREIGNTY AND SUBSISTENCE: 
NATIVE SELF-GOVERNMENT AND 
RIGHTS TO HUNT, FISH, AND 
GATHER AFTER ANCSA 
ROBERT T. ANDERSON* 
ABSTRACT 
The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) was passed in 1971 to 
extinguish aboriginal rights of Alaska Natives and provide compensation for 
those rights extinguished. Instead of vesting assets (land and money) in tribal 
governments, Congress required the formation of Alaska Native corporations 
to receive and hold these assets. A major flaw in the settlement was the failure 
to provide statutory protections for the aboriginal hunting, fishing, and 
gathering rights extinguished by ANCSA. Moreover, while ANCSA did not 
directly address Alaska Native tribal status or jurisdiction, the Supreme Court 
interpreted the Act to terminate the Indian country status of ANCSA land. 
Subsequently, Title VIII of the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation 
Act (ANILCA) was adopted in 1980 to provide a subsistence priority for rural 
Alaska residents, but the approach contemplated in Title VIII failed due to the 
State of Alaska’s unwillingness to participate. On the self-government front, 
state and federal courts have joined the federal Executive Branch and Congress 
in recognizing that Alaska Native tribes have the same legal status as other 
federally recognized tribes in the lower forty-eight states. The Obama 
Administration recently changed its regulations to allow land to be taken in 
trust for Alaska Native tribes, and thus be considered Indian country subject 
to tribal jurisdiction, and generally precluding most state authority. This 
article explains these developments and offers suggestions for a legal and policy 
path forward. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Indigenous occupancy of what is now Alaska began over 11,000 
years ago, and Russian exploration of coastal areas began in the mid-
eighteenth century. Russia claimed ownership of Alaska by virtue of 
“discovery” and passed the rights it claimed to the United States by treaty 
in 1867. Piecemeal encroachment on tribal territories by the government 
increased over time, as Alaska’s non-Native population expanded. Alaska 
Natives, like all other indigenous populations within what became the 
United States, possessed property rights in the form of aboriginal title, 
which is based on principles of international law adopted as federal 
common law.1 Part I of this Article outlines the history of Alaska Native 
aboriginal rights prior to passage of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement 
Act (ANCSA). Part II reviews the history of ANCSA, its structure, and its 
effect on tribal sovereignty and hunting and fishing rights. Part III 
examines the post-ANCSA judicial and congressional treatment of Alaska 
Native sovereignty and subsistence uses, and offers suggestions for 
improvements. 
The view that Alaska Natives possessed property rights and rights 
to self-government under federal law became the accepted view of the 
national government, but there was little pressure to deal with Alaska 
Native land claims until the 1950s when statehood became a reality. 
Although statehood itself did not affect aboriginal title, it was the first in 
a series of events that led Congress to pass ANCSA in 1971.2 ANCSA 
extinguished aboriginal title, but left unresolved important questions 
regarding tribal sovereignty and Native hunting and fishing rights. The 
sovereign status of Alaska Native villages has been confirmed, though 
their territorial sovereignty was severely limited by the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of ANCSA in Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal 
Government.3 
However, tribal sovereignty decisions from federal and state courts, 
along with recent Obama Administration action permitting land to be 
taken in trust for Alaska Native tribes, point toward an expansion of 
Native self-governance. The main vehicle for protecting tribal access to 
fish and game in all lands in Alaska, Title VIII of the Alaska National 
Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA),4 relied on a cooperative 
 
 1. See generally Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823) (adopting the 
international principle that a discovering government claims exclusive title to 
land it discovers subject to the right of occupancy of indigenous peoples). 
 2. Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (1971) (current version at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601–
1629h (2012)). 
 3. 522 U.S. 520 (1998). 
 4. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3111–3126 (1980). 
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federalism model that has failed due to the State of Alaska’s 
unwillingness to participate in a regime it initially supported.  Forty-five 
years after ANCSA’s passage, it is evident that congressional and federal 
administrative action is needed to remedy these flaws in the Settlement 
Act. 
I. ABORIGINAL TITLE IN ALASKA5 
When the United States acquired Alaska from Russia in 1867 
pursuant to the Treaty of Cession,6 what is now the State of Alaska was 
essentially unknown and unexplored by non-Native7 people. Article III 
of the Treaty provided that “[t]he uncivilized tribes will be subject to such 
laws and regulations as the United States may, from time to time, adopt 
in regard to aboriginal tribes of that country.”8 In essence, the United 
States stepped into Russia’s shoes with respect to its relationship with the 
people who inhabited Alaska and occupied the land and waters.9 The 
 
 5.  Section I and parts of Section II originally appeared in a 2007 article 
written by Professor Anderson and published in the Tulsa Law Review. Robert T. 
Anderson, Alaska Native Rights, Statehood, and Unfinished Business, 43 Tulsa L. 
Rev. 17 (2007). We have included these updated sections here with the express 
permission of the Tulsa Law Review. These earlier sections have been included as 
a way to provide context for the latter, updated portions of the article. Those 
wishing to read the original 2007 article may do 
so here: http://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=259
9&context=tlr. 
 6. Treaty Concerning the Cession of Russian Possessions in North America, 
Russ.-U.S., Mar. 30, 1867, 15 Stat. 539 [hereinafter Treaty of Cession]. For a history 
of the Russian exploration and assertion of control over parts of Alaska, see CHIEF 
OF THE FOREIGN LAW SECTION LAW LIBRARY, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, RUSSIAN 
ADMINISTRATION OF ALASKA AND THE STATUS OF THE ALASKA NATIVES, S. DOC. NO. 
81-152 at 45, 50–51 (1950). See also HUBERT HOWE BANCROFT, HISTORY OF ALASKA 
1730-1885 (1886); Richard H. Bloedel, The Alaska Statehood Movement 1–5 (Mar. 
9, 1974) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington) (on file with 
the Suzzallo and Allen Libraries, University of Washington). 
 7. The term “Alaska Native” is generally used as a collective reference to 
Alaska’s various indigenous groups. 
 8. Treaty of Cession, supra note 6. The population was roughly 27,000 
Natives, 1,400 Creoles, 480 Russians and Siberians, 200 non-Russian foreigners, 
and 150 American civilians. Bloedel, supra note 6, at 1. 
 9. See, e.g., Alaska v. United States, 422 U.S. 184, 192 n.13 (1975) (“By the 
Treaty of Cession in 1867 Russia ceded to the United States ‘all the territory and 
dominion now possessed (by Russia) on the continent of America and in the 
adjacent islands.’ 15 Stat. 539. The cession was effectively a quitclaim. It is 
undisputed that the United States thereby acquired whatever dominion Russia 
had possessed immediately prior to cession.”); see also DAVID S. CASE & DAVID A. 
VOLUCK, ALASKA NATIVES AND AMERICAN LAWS 24–26 (3d ed. 2012) (discussing the 
relationship between the United States and Alaska Natives after the transition 
from Russian to United States sovereignty). 
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plain import of the provision in the treaty was that general federal law 
governing Native rights was applicable. 
Congress did nothing to suggest otherwise in subsequent actions. In 
1868, Congress designated Alaska as a “customs collection district” and 
extended United States laws relating to customs, commerce, and 
navigation over the “mainland, islands, and waters of the territory” of 
Alaska.10 Under federal law, this designation had no legal or practical 
effect on Alaska Natives, and simply began a congressional practice of 
legislating for Alaska on a piecemeal basis with no consideration of 
Alaska Native rights.11 The United States was essentially a colonizing 
nation asserting rights without much regard to the indigenous 
population. 
What was the law regarding the indigenous inhabitants in areas that 
came to be claimed by the United States? Under general principles of 
international law, discovering nations acquired the exclusive right to deal 
with indigenous peoples with respect to matters of land ownership and 
intergovernmental relations.12 In Johnson v. M’Intosh,13 Chief Justice 
Marshall explained that under this so-called Doctrine of Discovery, 
indigenous tribes have a “legal as well as just claim to retain possession 
of [the lands]” they historically occupied.14 
Following M’Intosh, the rights of the discovering nation, Russia and 
then the United States, would similarly consist of a technical legal title 
plus the “right of preemption”—the right to acquire the full beneficial title 
to land used and occupied by the indigenous occupants.15 The right of 
Alaska Natives to use and occupy their lands (i.e., their rights as property 
owners) would be labeled by federal law to be aboriginal title, or original 
Indian title. Of course, the Alaska Natives had no such understanding, 
much less agreement, with the proposition that Russia, the United States, 
or any other country could divest the Native peoples of their rights to soil 
 
 10. Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 273, 15 Stat. 240. 
 11. See CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 9 at 24–25. 
 12. See generally COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 1.02[1]–[2], at 
9–18 (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2012) [hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK] (explaining 
the origins and development of this policy). For a comprehensive history of the 
discovery doctrine, see ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN 
WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT (1990). 
 13. 21 U.S. 543 (1823). 
 14. Id. at 574. See also Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 2 (1831) (“The 
Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestionable, and heretofore 
unquestioned right to the lands they occupy, until that right shall be extinguished 
by a voluntary cession to our government.”). 
 15. For an illuminating analysis of Johnson v. M’Intosh and its progeny, see 
LINDSAY G. ROBERTSON, CONQUEST BY LAW (2005). See generally COHEN’S 
HANDBOOK, supra note 12, § 15.04[1]–[2], at 999–1004 (explaining forms of tribal 
property). 
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and their way of life without their voluntary consent. Chief Justice 
Marshall was aware of the arrogance of the legal proposition introduced 
in M’Intosh: 
However extravagant the pretension of converting the discovery 
of an inhabited country into conquest may appear; if the 
principle has been asserted in the first instance, and afterwards 
sustained; if a country has been acquired and held under it; if 
the property of the great mass of the community originates in it, 
it becomes the law of the land, and cannot be questioned.16 
Thus, the United States’ legal claim to title was rooted in Supreme 
Court precedent, and the framework for eventual extinguishment of 
Alaska Native aboriginal title was in place.17 
It is now generally accepted that prior to adoption of ANCSA,18 
Alaska Natives possessed unextinguished aboriginal title, which 
included hunting, fishing and gathering rights.19 There were indigenous 
people and societies on the ground in Alaska, and they had their own 
systems of governance and land use rights.20 In retrospect, it seems 
ludicrous to think that the notion of indigenous land rights was even a 
matter of debate. As one Native leader described the concept of land 
“ownership,” it is plain that the Native system recognized its own form 
of property rights: 
The notion of private ownership was alien to most of our people. 
We had lived throughout the length and breadth of Alaska, 
using the land as our forefathers had, becoming intimate with its 
ways as it nurtured, however grudgingly at times, our 
 
 16. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 591. 
 17. See STUART BANNER, HOW THE INDIANS LOST THEIR LAND (2005) (surveying 
federal-Indian land transactions and underlying policies). 
 18. Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (1971) (current version at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601–
1629h (2012)). 
 19. See Tlingit and Haida Indians v. United States, 177 F. Supp. 452, 461–63 
(Ct. Cl. 1959) (rejecting the United States’ argument that Alaska Natives could not 
have possessed aboriginal title due to their mode of socio-political organization); 
see also Status of Alaskan Natives, 53 Interior Dec. 593, 595 (1932) (“[T]hese 
[Alaska] natives are now unquestionably considered and treated as being under 
the guardianship and protection of the Federal Government, at least to such an 
extent as to bring them within the spirit, if not within the exact letter, of the laws 
relative to American Indians . . . .”); cf. Native Vill. of Eyak v. Blank, 688 F.3d 619 
(9th Cir. 2012) (assuming existence of aboriginal title in Outer Continental Shelf 
of Alaska but rejecting claim based on lack of exclusive use). 
 20. WILLIAM L. IGGIAGRUK HENSLEY, FIFTY MILES FROM TOMORROW: A MEMOIR 
OF ALASKA AND THE REAL PEOPLE 108 (2009). 
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existence . . . . A house built by the leader of a family would 
“belong” to him and his relatives in a loose sense[.]21 
The author further explained that the advent of reorganized tribal 
governance under the Indian Reorganization Act “didn’t change very 
much the ways we had shared the land for generations.”22 
Native tribes establish their aboriginal title in United States courts 
by demonstrating actual use and/or occupation of an area on a 
continuous basis, except for periods of involuntary dispossession, and 
this property right is not “based upon a treaty, statute, or other  formal 
government action.”23 In Tlingit and Haida Indians v. United States,24 the 
court of claims affirmed the existence of aboriginal title among the Tlingit 
and Haida Indians of Alaska, stating that “land and water owned and 
claimed by each local clan division in a village was usually well-defined 
as to area and use,” with tracts “parceled out or assigned to the individual 
house groups for use and exploitation,” and “[c]ertain designated 
offshore fishing and sea mammal hunting areas in larger bodies of water” 
available for common use by various clans’ members residing within “a 
particular geographical area, but” not to those Indians living outside that 
geographical area.25 The court’s ruling was consistent with an earlier 
opinion from the Department of the Interior (DOI) recognizing aboriginal 
fishing rights of Alaska Natives.26 
Typically, the United States acquired tribal lands pursuant to 
treaty,27 as negotiated by the Executive Branch and approved by the 
Senate. But while that had been the pattern since the formation of the 
United States, by the 1860s the House of Representatives became 
increasingly resentful of the fact that it was being called upon repeatedly 
to appropriate funds for treaty obligations it had not participated in 
approving. To resolve a budget stalemate over the Interior 
Appropriations Bill, the Senate agreed to a statute that ended treaty-
 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339, 347 (1941). This “right of 
occupancy is considered as sacred [to Native people] as the fee simple of the 
whites.” Id. at 345 (quoting Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. 711, 746 (1835)). 
 24. 177 F. Supp. at 456. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Aboriginal Fishing Rights in Alaska, 57 Interior Dec. 461, 474, 476 (1942) 
(“The Indian who has been forbidden [through government callousness or 
indifference] from fishing in his back yard has not thereby lost his aboriginal title 
thereto. I conclude that aboriginal occupancy establishes possessory rights in 
Alaskan waters and submerged lands, and that such rights have not been 
extinguished by any treaty, statute, or administrative action.”). 
 27. BANNER, supra note 17, at 252. See also Felix S. Cohen, Original Indian Title, 
32 MINN. L. REV. 28, 34–35 (1947). 
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making with tribes.28 Since Alaska’s acquisition by the United States in 
1867 predated the formal termination of treaty-making with Indian tribes 
by only four years, there was little time within which treaties might have 
been negotiated and ratified.29 Thus, agreements after 1871 were 
negotiated with tribes by executive branch representatives and then 
presented to both houses of Congress for ratification by statute, or statutes 
taking tribal land for compensation were adopted, but conditioned on 
subsequent tribal consent.30 The geographic isolation of Alaska and its 
sparse non-Native population meant there was no need for an 
expeditious elimination of Alaska Native aboriginal rights.31 Early federal 
legislation simply maintained the status quo or completely ignored the 
issue. 
A. Early Federal Governance in Alaska 
In 1884, Congress took its first major step toward governance of 
Alaska when it passed an Organic Act,32 establishing a civil government 
for the district of Alaska with the laws of Oregon made applicable.33 With 
respect to Alaska Natives, Congress provided that “the Indians or other 
persons in said district shall not be disturbed in the possession of any 
lands actually in their use or occupation or now claimed by them but the 
terms under which such persons may acquire title to such lands is 
reserved for future legislation by Congress.”34 A historian writing in 1886 
stated that “it is probable that the natives would be only too glad to be 
left alone as severely in the future as they had been in the past.”35 
 
 28. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 566 (codified as amended at 25 
U.S.C. § 71 (2012)). 
 29. Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 203 (1975) (citations omitted) (“[The 
end of treaty-making] meant no more, however, than that after 1871 relations with 
Indians would be governed by Acts of Congress and not by treaty. The change in 
no way affected Congress’ plenary powers to legislate on problems of Indians, 
including legislating the ratification of contracts of the Executive Branch with 
Indian tribes to which affected States were not parties.”). 
 30. BANNER, supra note 17, at 252. 
 31. In 1880 and 1890 the non-Native population was 430 and 6,698, 
respectively. ROBERT D. ARNOLD, ALASKA NATIVE LAND CLAIMS 71 (1976). 
 32. Act of May 17, 1884, ch. 53, 23 Stat. 24. Section 2 of the Organic Act 
provided for an appointed Governor, while remaining provisions of the Act called 
for the appointment of judges and commissioners. Id. 
 33. Id. § 7, at 25–26. 
 34. Id. § 8, at 26. In Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955), the 
Supreme Court held that the Organic Act did not recognize or confirm Native 
ownership for Fifth Amendment Takings Clause purposes, but merely preserved 
aboriginal title for later disposition. Id. at 278. 
 35. BANCROFT, supra note 6, at 640. 
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Congress provided a criminal code for Alaska in 1899,36 and a year later 
extended mining laws to Alaska, while withholding application of 
general public land laws.37 Like the Organic Act of 1884, later statutes 
provided that Alaska Natives were not to be disturbed in their use and 
occupancy of land.38 Territorial courts, as well as the Solicitor of the DOI, 
treated this Act as confirming that Alaska Natives held unextinguished 
aboriginal rights to land and to hunt and fish.39 For the most part, Alaska 
Natives maintained their ways of life and continued to occupy their 
territories largely without outside interference.40 Alaska officially became 
a “United States Territory” with a legislative body in 1912,41 and the first 
statehood bill was introduced in Congress in 1916.42 But for the most part, 
consideration of Native rights would be left to federal officials. 
Like the treatment of Alaska Native rights to property, Native rights 
to hunt, fish, and gather were also provided special protection in some 
cases through exemptions from general government regulations.43 Alaska 
Natives were thus exempted from the ambit of several wildlife 
 
 36. Act of Mar. 3, 1899, ch. 429, 30 Stat. 1253. 
 37. Act of June 6, 1900, ch. 786, § 26, 31 Stat. 321. 
 38. Id. § 27, at 330; United States v. Atl. Richfield Co., 435 F. Supp. 1009, 1014–
15 (D. Alaska 1977) (citations omitted) (“The second Organic Act, for example, 
provided that Natives ‘shall not be disturbed in the possession of any lands now 
actually in their use and occupancy . . . .’”). 
 39. United States v. Cadzow, 5 Alaska 125, 132 (D. Alaska 1914); United States 
v. Berrigan, 2 Alaska 442, 449–50 (D. Alaska 1905) (explaining that the Organic Act 
of 1900 rendered “void all attempts to dispossess [Natives] of their land by deed 
or contract.”); Aboriginal Fishing Rights in Alaska, 57 Interior Dec. 461, 474 (1942). 
See also CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 9, at 66 (“If one reads article III of the 1867 
treaty and all of the cases together, the most satisfactory legal conclusion is that 
prior to ANCSA the Alaska Natives held their lands in Alaska by right of 
aboriginal possession.”). But see Worthen Lumber Mills v. Alaska Juneau Gold 
Mining Co., 229 F. 966 (9th Cir. 1916); Sutter v. Heckman, 1 Alaska 188 (D. Alaska 
1901), aff’d on other grounds, Heckman v. Sutter, 119 F. 83 (9th Cir. 1902) (involving 
disputes between non-Natives over possession of land purportedly conveyed by 
individual Indians). In Miller v. United States, 159 F.2d 997 (9th Cir. 1947), the court 
concluded that the Treaty of Cession in 1867 extinguished aboriginal title, but that 
the disclaimer in the 1884 Organic Act preserved individual rights of occupancy. 
Id. at 1001–02, 1003–04. Miller’s holding as to extinguishment was implicitly 
repudiated in Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279–82 (1955). The 
idea that the Treaty of Cession eliminated Native aboriginal title runs afoul of the 
rule that federal acts extinguishing tribal property rights must clearly express 
such an intent. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2032 (2014). 
 40. See supra notes 38–39. 
 41. Act of August 24, 1912, ch. 387, 37 Stat. 512. See Bloedel, supra note 6, at 
20–23 (explaining the structure of Alaska’s territorial legislature as defined by the 
Act of August 24, 1912). 
 42. H.R. 13978, 64th Cong. (1916). The events leading up to introduction of the 
statehood bill are recounted in Bloedel, supra note 6, at 35–47. 
 43. The obvious difference is the lack of treaty-based rights due to the end of 
treaty-making in 1871. See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text. 
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conservation measures adopted by Congress prior to statehood. For 
example, Congress limited the taking of fur seals, but exempted Native 
hunting for food, clothing, and boat-manufacture.44 Congress’s first 
hunting regulations prohibited the destruction or taking of game animals 
and birds, and set seasons and bag limits for hunting, but exempted 
hunting for food or clothing by “native Indians or Eskimos or by miners, 
explorers, or travelers on a journey when in need of food.”45 The 1916 
Migratory Bird Convention with Great Britain exempted Natives from the 
closed seasons for certain species.46 In 1925, Congress established an 
Alaska Game Commission which authorized “any Indian or Eskimo, 
prospector, or traveler to take animals or birds during the close season 
when he is in absolute need of food and other food is not available . . . .”47 
The Reindeer Industry Act of 193748 was intended to provide for Native 
subsistence needs and establish a Native monopoly over the reindeer 
industry.49 
B. Efforts to Westernize Alaska Native Aboriginal Title 
While Alaska Natives had claims to aboriginal title, and were 
obviously present on the landscape, it was not clear whether Alaska 
Natives could obtain fee title to individual parcels of land under 
applicable federal law.50 Because tribal claims to aboriginal title had not 
 
 44. Act of July 1, 1870, ch. 189, 16 Stat. 180, 180. 
 45. Act of June 7, 1902, ch. 1037, 32 Stat. 327, 327 (amended 1908). 
 46. Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds, Gr. Brit.-U.S., Aug. 16, 
1916, 39 Stat. 1702. This pattern continued with respect to birds in the 1990s when 
migratory bird treaties with Canada and Mexico were amended by protocols, 
which exempt the taking of migratory birds and their eggs by Alaska Natives. 
Protocol Amending Convention for Protection of Migratory Birds and Game 
Mammals, Mex.-U.S., May 5, 1997, Treaty Doc. 105-26; Protocol Amending the 
1916 Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds, Can.-U.S., Aug. 14, 1995, 
Treaty Doc. 104-28. 
 47. Alaska Game Law, ch. 75, 43 Stat. 739, 739, 744 (1925) (amended 1938, 1940, 
1943). The 1925 statute also imposed a one-year territorial residency requirement, 
id. at 740, which was amended to authorize a three-year residency requirement 
for trapping licenses whenever “the economic welfare and interests of native 
Indians or Eskimos” were threatened by non-Native trapping. Act of June 25, 
1938, ch. 686, 52 Stat. 1169, 1170. These protective statutes were removed from the 
U.S. Code upon statehood. See 48 U.S.C. §§ 192–211 (2012). 
 48. Reindeer Industry Act of 1937, ch. 897, 50 Stat. 900. 
 49. See id.; Gigi Berardi, Natural Resource Policy, Unforgiving Geographies, and 
Persistent Poverty in Alaska Native Villages, 38 NAT. RES. J. 85, 98–99 (1998) 
(emphasizing subsistence as a way of life for Alaska Natives). But see Williams v. 
Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657, 659–60 (9th Cir. 1997) (interpreting statute to not provide 
Natives a monopoly over the reindeer industry, but rather to permit non-Native 
ownership of imported reindeer). 
 50. See Miller v. United States, 159 F.2d 997 (9th Cir. 1947) (evidencing 
confusion about whether Alaska Natives could obtain fee title under federal law). 
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been extinguished, the grant of a parcel of land to anyone—Native or non-
Native—would presumably transfer only a legal interest subject to the 
Native right of use and occupancy.51 This right of occupancy was a 
protectable interest, but Congress nevertheless took two actions to 
provide Alaska Natives with the opportunity to obtain title to land under 
some form of federal supervision. First, individual Alaska Natives could 
acquire title to land from the United States pursuant to the Alaska 
Allotment Act of 1906.52 The Allotment Act was not part of a move to 
break up reservations as in the lower forty-eight states,53 but rather was 
intended to provide a way for individual Alaska Natives to acquire title 
to individual parcels of land important for traditional use and 
occupancy.54 Title to up to 160 acres of land would be granted if 
individual applicants could demonstrate continuous use and occupancy 
for five years.55 The other means provided for individual Native land 
ownership was supplied by the Alaska Native Townsite Act of 1926,56 
which permitted Native occupants of populated areas to obtain restricted 
fee lots in areas surveyed by a federal “townsite trustee.”57 
Congress and the Executive Branch also established reservations in 
a fashion similar to that followed in the rest of the United States after 1871. 
In Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States,58 the Supreme Court upheld 
regulations banning encroachment by non-Native fishermen in waters 
 
 51. See id. at 1003–06 (indicating that aboriginal title had been extinguished in 
the 1867 Treaty of Cession, but that the 1884 Organic Act recognized some form 
of individual Native title). The case has been repudiated by the Supreme Court 
and the Solicitor of the DOI and cannot be reconciled with general federal Indian 
law principles. See supra note 39. 
 52. Act of May 17, 1906, ch. 2469, 34 Stat. 197, repealed by Alaska Native Claims 
and Settlement Act, 85 Stat. 688 (1971) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1617 (2012)). 
 53. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 12, § 16.03[2], at 1072–75 (explaining 
allotment policy generally as implemented in the lower forty-eight). As a 
consequence of the allotment process in the lower forty-eight states, tribal and 
individual Indian land holdings were reduced from roughly 150 million acres in 
1887 to fifty million acres in 1934. Id. Of the thirty-six million acres allotted to 
individuals by 1920, twenty-seven million acres had passed out of Indian hands 
by 1934. Id. at 1074. 
 54. See generally Allotment of Land to Alaska Natives, 71 Interior Dec. 340 
(1964) (canvassing prior administrative interpretations of the Act); CASE & 
VOLUCK, supra note 9, at 117–19; COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 12, § 
4.07[3][b][iv], at 338–40. 
 55. Allotment of Land to Alaska Natives, 71 Interior Dec. at 354–55, 357. See 
Akootchook v. United States, 271 F.3d 1160, 1161 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 56. Act of May 25, 1926, ch. 379, 44 Stat. 629 (repealed by Federal Land Policy 
and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 702, 90 Stat. 2743 (codified in 
43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1722 (2012)). 
 57. For a description of the program see Aleknagik Natives v. United States, 635 
F. Supp. 1477, 1479–80 (D. Alaska 1985). For a comprehensive review of the Native 
town site and allotment programs, see CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 9, at 113–52. 
 58. 248 U.S. 78 (1918). 
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adjacent to the Annette Islands.59 The statute creating the reservation did 
not mention the waters explicitly when it created the Annette Island 
Indian reservation.60 In interpreting the statute, the Court applied the 
basic Indian law jurisprudence as in the contiguous states. The Court 
accordingly ruled that the  reservation of the islands included the 
surrounding waters because they were necessary to fulfill the purpose of 
establishing the reservation, which was to provide a homeland with a 
fishing economy.61  In reaching its conclusion, the Court followed the 
liberal canons of interpretation generally applicable in Indian law.62 
The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA),63 was made applicable 
to Alaska in 1936,64 and a number of Alaska Native tribes reorganized 
their governments under the IRA.65 Much controversy ensued in the 
1940s and continued into the 1950s after the Secretary of the Interior used 
his authority under the IRA to establish six reservations, with the largest 
being the Venetie Indian Reservation consisting of approximately 1.4 
million acres.66 Eleven reservations had been created by Executive 
Order,67 and several others, including all of St. Lawrence Island, were set 
aside as Reindeer Reserves prior to enactment of the IRA.68 As discussed 
below, the anxiety that many non-Native Alaskans felt regarding 
 
 59. Id. at 88–90. 
 60. Id. at 86–87. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908) (Indian 
reservation included implied reservation of water to fulfill agricultural purpose 
of reservation). 
 61. Alaska Pac. Fisheries, 248 U.S. at 89. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 987 (1934) (current version at 25 U.S.C. 
§§ 5101–5119 (2012)). 
 64. Act of May 1, 1936, ch. 254, 49 Stat. 1250 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 5119 
(2012)). 
 65. By 1947 the United States Indian Service documented that over fifty tribes 
in Alaska had organized under the IRA. T. HAAS, U.S. INDIAN SERV., DEP’T. OF 
INTERIOR, TEN YEARS OF TRIBAL GOVERNMENT UNDER THE IRA 29–30 (1947). The 
Solicitor of the DOI put the number at sixty-nine in 1993. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, OFFICE 
OF THE SOLICITOR, M-36975, GOVERNMENTAL JURISDICTION OF ALASKA NATIVE 
VILLAGES OVER LAND AND PEOPLE 33 (Jan. 11, 1993). 
 66. See CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 9, at 444 (Table V-3). This report was 
developed in response to a request from United States Senator Henry M. Jackson, 
Chairman of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, “for a compilation of 
background data and interpretive materials relevant to a fair and intelligent 
resolution of the Alaska Native problem.” Id. (emphasis added). Contrary to some 
popular assertions, there was apparently considerable interest by Alaska Natives 
in the establishment of reservations for their benefit. Eleven other reservations 
were sought under the IRA and another ninety were also requested by 1950, 
although no action was taken by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Id. at 443. 
 67. CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 9, at 87 n.31. 
 68. Id. at 87–89. 
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establishment of reservations led to a number of efforts to foreclose the 
legal authority to create them.69 
In 1943, the Secretary established the Karluk Indian reservation on 
Kodiak Island,70 designating adjacent tidelands and coastal waters under 
the IRA’s authority to reserve “public lands which are actually occupied 
by Indians or Eskimos” in Alaska.71 The Supreme Court rejected a 
challenge to the Secretary’s inclusion of navigable waters in the 
reservation, noting that for Natives “the adjacent fisheries are as 
important, perhaps more important than the forests, the furbearing 
animals or the minerals.”72 The reservation was established for the very 
purpose of buffering the Natives from the non-Native commercial fishing 
competition.73 The case was simply another product of the increase in 
Alaska’s non-Native population and continued encroachment on areas 
important for aboriginal uses. It also coincided with the inexorable 
movement towards statehood. 
C.  Statehood and Aboriginal Rights 
The question of extinguishing Alaska Native aboriginal claims 
picked up steam following World War II, after which Alaska’s population 
increased dramatically.74 At times, confusing court decisions made it 
appear that there might not be much substance to the Native claims.75 By 
1943, though, the establishment of reservations for Alaska Natives by the 
Roosevelt Administration prompted Anthony Dimond, Alaska’s delegate 
to Congress, to propose massive transfers of federal land to the Territory 
 
 69. Bloedel, supra note 6, at 267–68 (discussing proposals to revoke the 
Secretary of the Interior’s authority to create Indian reservations and replace it 
with authority “to issue patents to ‘Native tribes, and villages or individuals for 
the lands actually possessed, used or occupied for town sites, villages, 
smokehouses, gardens, burial grounds, or missionary stations.’”). A look back 
reveals that no reservations were in fact created after 1946. CASE & VOLUCK, supra 
note 9, at 101, 105-106. 
 70. Exec. Order No. 128, 8 Fed. Reg. 8557 (May 22, 1943). 
 71. Hynes v. Grimes Packing Co., 337 U.S. 86, 100 (1949). 
 72. Id. at 114. 
 73. See id. at 116. 
 74. Bloedel, supra note 6, at 88. The non-Native population grew from 29,295 
in 1929 to 94,780 in 1950 and then to 183,086 by 1960. ARNOLD, supra note 31, at 71. 
 75. Miller v. United States included dictum that Native aboriginal title had 
been extinguished in 1867. See CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 9, at 71-72 (discussing 
alterntive interpetations of the Miller dictum); MARY CLAY BERRY, THE ALASKA 
PIPELINE: THE POLITICS OF OIL AND NATIVE LAND CLAIMS 31 (1975) (noting that in 
1954, “many Senators did not think the [land] claims were valid.”)  See also note 
38, supra. 
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of Alaska so as to preclude the establishment of new Indian reservations 
under the IRA.76 
Hearings on statehood took place at several locations around Alaska 
in 1945. Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes spoke in favor of it, 
discussing that “the ancestral claims of the Native population should be 
affirmed, delineated, or extinguished with compensation.”77 The first bill 
introduced in the post-war period provided for statehood, but did not 
include any reference to Native aboriginal rights, causing the DOI, led by 
Secretary Julius Krug, to propose amendments requiring the State and its 
people to disclaim any interest in land owned or held by any Native.78 
The situation became more complicated as a provision precluding the 
establishment of any reservations in Alaska was linked to the statehood 
bill.79 The upshot was that statehood bills failed in the 80th and 81st 
Congresses. 
For the most part, however, non-Native Alaskans were not prepared 
or willing to deal with Native claims to aboriginal title during the post-
war economic expansion.80 One historian described the situation thus: 
During this period of economic growth, the Natives were 
growing increasingly aware of their rights and asked repeatedly 
for the protections of reservations. Their petitions were 
ignored. . . . No one wanted to talk about the claims. This issue 
was a highly emotional Pandora’s box: to open it would let out 
bigotry and greed and fears that were inappropriate in a group 
of people petitioning for admission to the democratic United 
States of America.81 
 
 76. Bloedel, supra note 6, at 95. 
 77. Id. at 124. 
 78. Id. at 192–94 (describing the disclaimer as “copied from Arizona, New 
Mexico and other recent states”). 
 79. See id. at 267–68 (noting the uproar against statehood when news broke 
regarding the reservations restrictions). 
 80. See id. at 220–21. 
 81. MARY CLAY BERRY, THE ALASKA PIPELINE: THE POLITICS OF OIL AND NATIVE 
LAND CLAIMS 25 (1975). Anti-Native sentiment was rampant among non-Natives 
in Alaska: 
In 1944, Juneau was a Jim Crow town where the windows of many bars 
and restaurants warned “No Dogs or Indians Allowed.” Windows in 
Anchorage and Fairbanks had similar signs. In Nome, seating in the local 
movie theater was segregated. And after touring the territory the 
previous winter, a Bureau of Indian Affairs social worker described 
Alaska to Commissioner of Indian Affairs John Collier as a “territory 
where race prejudice is more shocking than in the South.” 
DONALD C. MITCHELL, SOLD AMERICAN: THE STORY OF ALASKA NATIVES AND THEIR 
LAND, 1867–1959, at 332–33 (1997) (footnote omitted). In fact, the territorial 
legislature rejected an effort to outlaw discrimination. Id. at 333. 
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It was in this context that Congress considered a number of 
approaches to the extinguishment of Alaska Native land claims.82 Some 
of these would have provided Alaska Natives with the right to sue the 
United States over compensation for the loss of aboriginal lands,83 while 
others provided for the confirmation of title to relatively small amounts 
of land in and around the Native villages.84 The effort to extinguish 
Alaska Native claims to aboriginal title subsided to some degree when the 
Supreme Court decided Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States,85 which was 
incorrectly interpreted by some as clearing the way for non-Native 
development and presumably, acquisition of Native lands.86 In fact, the 
Court simply held that aboriginal title, unrecognized by Congress, was 
not subject to the just compensation clause of the Fifth Amendment.87 The 
Court did not hold that aboriginal title did not exist and appeared to 
assume just the opposite. 
While some members of Congress continued to believe the 
settlement of Native aboriginal claims should take place prior to Alaskan 
statehood,88 that view did not prevail. The approach chosen by Congress 
in the Statehood Act set up an inevitable conflict between aboriginal 
property rights and State land selections under another section of the 
Statehood Act. Article 4 of the Statehood Act89 provided that the State 
must disclaim any right to the property of Alaska Natives (including 
 
 82. MITCHELL, supra note 81, at 332–37. It was also during this period that 
Congress evidenced its hostility toward ongoing government-to-government 
relationships with Indian tribes when it adopted a resolution calling for the 
termination of the federal-tribal relationship with certain Indian tribes. H.R. Con. 
Res. 108, 83d Cong. 1st Sess., 67 Stat. B132 (1953). This termination policy was 
intended to eventually do away completely with recognition of Indian tribes as 
sovereign entities under federal law. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 12, § 1.06, 
at 84–93 (explaining termination policy generally). 
 83. MITCHELL, supra note 81, at 333. 
 84. Id. at 334. 
 85. 348 U.S. 272 (1955). 
 86. MITCHELL, supra note 81, at 358. 
 87. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, 348 U.S. 272 at 278–79 (“There is no particular form 
for congressional recognition of Indian right of permanent occupancy. It may be 
established in a variety of ways but there must be the definite intention by 
congressional action or authority to accord legal rights, not merely permissive 
occupation.”). The Court concluded that there was no such congressional 
recognition, but implicit in its ruling was the acknowledgement that Alaska 
Natives did have aboriginal title claims. Id. at 275 (“The Court of Claims . . . held 
that petitioner was an identifiable group of American Indians residing in Alaska; 
that its interest in the lands prior to purchase of Alaska by the United States in 
1867 was ‘original Indian title’ or ‘Indian right of occupancy.’”). 
 88. This is not to imply that the efforts had no connection. Extinguishment of 
Native land claims was viewed by some as a prerequisite to statehood. See 
MITCHELL, supra note 81, at 367 (quoting Senator Hugh Butler to the effect that it 
was “futile” to discuss Alaska Statehood without dealing first with Native claims). 
 89. Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85-508, § 4, 72 Stat. 339, 339 (1958). 
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fishing rights) and that such property remained under the “absolute 
jurisdiction and control of the United States . . . .”90 Corresponding 
language appears in the Alaska Constitution as required by the Statehood 
Act.91 At the same time, however, Section 6(b) of the Statehood Act 
granted the State of Alaska the right to select “within twenty-five years 
after the admission of Alaska into the Union, not to exceed one hundred 
and two million five hundred and fifty thousand acres from the public 
lands of the United States in Alaska which are vacant, unappropriated, 
and unreserved at the time of their selection[.]”92 The State’s efforts to 
implement the latter section were doomed until Native aboriginal claims 
were settled. 
Pressure to settle Native land claims gradually increased after 
statehood as the new State asserted its entitlement to land grants under 
the Statehood Act. Protests by Alaska Natives prompted the federal 
government to suspend transfer of public lands to Alaska. At the 
convention creating the Alaska Federation of Natives, Native leader 
Willie Hensley explained that he wrote the position paper “arguing that 
there was not ‘public land’ in Alaska. It was Native land unless there had 
been a previous taking by the federal government for federals. And if 
there had, then we [Natives] were owed compensation.”93 
As the State of Alaska began to select lands, Native villages protested 
to the Secretary of the Interior that the lands chosen were not vacant and 
unoccupied, but were used and occupied for aboriginal purposes.94 The 
first protests occurred in 1961 when Alaska proposed establishing a 
recreations area on land near the Alaska Native Village of Minto—land 
that was important for Native hunting and fishing activities. Minto 
leaders filed a protest over the selection with the DOI, which effectively 
precluded transfers of land to the State.95 Secretary of the Interior Stewart 
Udall informally suspended the issuance of patents and tentative 
 
 90. Id. 
 91. ALASKA CONST., art. XII, § 12 (“The State and its people further disclaim all 
right or title in or to any property, including fishing rights, the right or title to 
which may be held by or for any Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut, or community thereof, 
as that right or title is defined in the act of admission. The State and its people 
agree that, unless otherwise provided by Congress, the property, as described in 
this section, shall remain subject to the absolute disposition of the United States. 
They further agree that no taxes will be imposed upon any such property, until 
otherwise provided by the Congress. This tax exemption shall not apply to 
property held by individuals in fee without restrictions on alienation.”). 
 92. Statehood Act § 6(b). Other subsections of § 6 provided for roughly 
another million acres in state selections or grants. See BERRY, supra note 81, at 31–
33. 
 93. HENSLEY, supra note 21, at 157. 
 94. ARNOLD, supra note 31, at 100–03. 
 95. Id. See also MITCHELL, supra note 81, at 379–80. 
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approvals of state selections in 1966,96 and on January 12, 1969, Secretary 
Udall imposed a formal freeze on further patenting or approval of 
applications for public lands in Alaska pending the settlement of Native 
claims.97 An effort by the State to set aside the land freeze was rejected by 
the Ninth Circuit in Alaska v. Udall.98 
In 1966, state officials complained that as a result of the protests, the 
state had received only three million acres of its land grant.99 This was a 
serious problem for the new State of Alaska, because “[a]t the time, the 
infant state was an economic basket case, running a deficit government 
with little revenue . . . just about 226,000 people, and very little private 
land to tax.”100 “Pressure to resolve Native claims in Alaska also came 
from the state and from oil companies wishing to exploit the state’s newly 
discovered petroleum resources.”101 “Oil development could not 
progress so long as Native claims clouded state authority to lease lands 
or transfer rights to the companies, [and hindered] federal capacity to 
authorize construction of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline[, necessary] to 
transport the oil.”102 Willie Hensley, who was serving in the State 
Legislature, as well as part of the Native land claims leadership effort, 
explained that “Alaska’s government and everyone else who had a stake 
in the new state’s success were doing everything in their power to get us 
[Natives] out of the way.”103 Hensley believed “that if the oil companies 
had not been able to find, pump, transport, and sell the oil under Prudhoe 
Bay, Alaska might have had to rescind statehood.”104 
Another pressing question was whether the State would have 
authority to regulate Native aboriginal hunting and fishing rights. The 
new state flexed its regulatory muscles in a case involving the use of fish 
traps by two Native villages pursuant to federal permits. In March 1959, 
the Secretary of the Interior issued regulations under authority of the 
White Act,105 permitting Angoon to operate three fish traps during the 
1959 season and Kake to operate four traps.106 The following year, the 
 
 96. CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 9, at 57. 
 97. See Public Land Order 4582, 34 Fed. Reg. 1025 (1969). 
 98. 420 F.2d 938 (9th Cir. 1969). 
 99. ARNOLD, supra note 31, at 112. 
 100. HENSLEY, supra note 21, at 136. 
 101. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 12, § 4.07[3][b][i], at 329. See HENSLEY, 
supra note 21, at 151; BERRY, supra note 81, at 123, 163–214. 
 102. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 12, § 4.07[3][b][i], at 329. See ARNOLD, supra 
note 31, at 137–47; Native Vill. of Allakaket v. Hickel, No. 706-70 (D.D.C. Apr. 1, 
1970) (enjoining the issuance of permits for the construction of trans-Alaska 
pipeline over Native-claimed lands). See also BERRY, supra note 81, at 123. 
 103. HENSLEY, supra note 21, at 137. 
 104. Id. at 152. 
 105. White Act, 43 Stat. 464 (codified as amended at 48 U.S.C. §§ 221–228). 
 106. 24 Fed. Reg. 2053, 2069 (Mar. 19, 1959). 
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Secretary authorized permanent operation of these trap sites and 
specified one additional site for Angoon and five more for Kake for 
possible future authorization.107 
State officials denied that the federal government had authority to 
exempt the Native fishers from state regulations, and arrested Native 
fishermen for violating Alaska’s anti-fish trap law. In the course of 
upholding state authority over off-reservation fishing,108 the United 
States Supreme Court said that the aboriginal rights disclaimer109 “was 
intended to preserve unimpaired the right of any Indian claimant to assert 
his claim, whether based on federal law, aboriginal right, or simply 
occupancy, against the Government. Appellants’ claims are ‘property 
including fishing rights’ within § 4.”110 
The Court nevertheless held that the State possessed regulatory 
authority over the exercise of aboriginal fishing rights—at least for 
conservation purposes. “This Court has never held that States lack power 
to regulate the exercise of aboriginal Indian rights, such as claimed here, 
or of those based on occupancy.”111 The disclaimer was said to relate only 
to interference with aboriginal property rights. The exercise of state 
regulatory jurisdiction over aboriginal fishing rights—at least with 
respect to the fish trap prohibition—was said to be consistent with 
aboriginal title.112 
 
 107. Organized Vill. of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 62 (1962), citing 25 C.F.R. 
(1961 Supp.) pt. 88. 
 108. Id. at 61–62. 
 109. Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85-508, § 4, 72 Stat. 339, 339 (1958). 
 110. Organized Vill. of Kake, 369 U.S. at 67. 
 111. Id. at 76. The Court’s reasoning was based in part on a now discredited 
case, Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1889), which held that Montana’s entry into 
the Union defeated certain tribal treaty rights. Id. at 504. In 1999, the Supreme 
Court stated, “[b]ut Race Horse rested on a false premise. As this Court’s 
subsequent cases have made clear, an Indian tribe’s rights to hunt, fish, and gather 
on state lands are not irreconcilable with a State’s sovereignty over the natural 
resources in the State.” Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa, 526 U.S. 172, 
204 (1999). 
 112. The Court ignored the fact that aboriginal property rights include the 
usufructuaory right to hunt, fish, and gather. As the Court stated in Mitchel v. 
United States, 34 U.S. 711, 746 (1834): 
Indian possession or occupation was considered with reference to their 
habits and modes of life; their hunting grounds were as much in their 
actual possession as the cleared fields of the whites; and their rights to 
its exclusive enjoyment in their own way and for their own purposes 
were as much respected, until they abandoned them, made a cession to 
the government, or an authorized sale to individuals. 
A rationale more consonant with the Court’s jurisprudence would have been to 
recognize that states have power to regulate only for conservation-based 
purposes, and that like Indian treaty rights, the State would first need to eliminate 
non-Native consumptive uses. Cf. Wash. Game Dep’t v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 
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The State’s inability to receive title to land under the Statehood Act, 
the injunction against permits and construction related to a trans-Alaska 
oil pipeline, and increasing disputes over fish and game resources, all set 
the table for movement on the settlement of Native land claims. Of these 
factors, however, it was the thirst for Alaska’s North Slope oil that served 
as the impetus for settlement of the land claims by Congress. 
II. THE ALASKA NATIVE CLAIMS SETTLEMENT ACT 
Passage of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) in 
1971 was undoubtedly the most important event in the history of Alaska 
Native people since 1867. If one views it from the perspective of the state 
and oil industry eager to develop oil and gas at Prudhoe Bay, ANCSA 
was a resounding success. It unequivocally extinguished all claims to 
aboriginal title in Alaska and also all claims for past damages based on 
trespass to Native aboriginal title. It also provided substantial 
compensation for Alaska Natives, at least if one accepts the proposition 
from the Tee-Hit-Ton case that whatever property interests Natives held 
under aboriginal title, they were not entitled to any compensation under 
the Fifth Amendment’s just compensation clause. Rather, compensation 
for extinguishment was something done out of a sense of fairness and 
justice, and was not based on recognition of legal title to the property that 
would be taken.113 
ANCSA was silent on the status of Native powers of self-
government, though the Supreme Court would later interpret the silence 
as fatal to the treatment of Native corporation lands as Indian country. 
ANCSA’s affirmative elimination of aboriginal hunting and fishing rights 
has had devastating effects on Native subsistence uses, and has made it 
extremely difficult for Native tribes to have a role in co-management by 
virtue of their reserved tribal rights.114 The issues of sovereignty and 
hunting and fishing rights are explored more fully in Part III of this article. 
The situation faced by Alaska Natives with respect to their 
aboriginal claims in the 1960s differed little from that faced by Indian 
tribes which entered into “agreements” with the United States in the late 
 
44, 49 (1973); COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 12, § 18.04[3], at 1177–84 (describing 
application of state authority to Native rights pursuant to conservation necessity 
principles). 
 113. For a historical critique of Tee-Hit-Ton, see Joseph William Singer, Erasing 
Indian Country: The Story of Tee Hit Ton Indians v. United States, in INDIAN LAW 
STORIES 229 (Goldberg et al. eds., 2011). 
 114. In contrast, the Indian tribes of western Washington by virtue of their 
treaty, had the right to harvest up to one-half of the available harvest free of state 
jurisdiction. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 12, §§ 18.03–18.04 (discussing 
regulatory jurisdiction over on- and off-reservation fishing and hunting rights). 
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nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.115 Alaska Natives had some say 
in the terms of the settlement of their land claims, and proved adept at 
using the system to maximize their economic share of the pie as their 
claims were settled.116 They did not, however, have a veto and could not 
postpone the inevitable for too long. The non-Natives, the oil companies 
and the State of Alaska were not going to go away, and the Native 
community fought for the best bargain it could get. Aboriginal claims 
would be settled, State land selections would proceed, and the trans-
Alaska pipeline would be authorized and built.117 
The question of how much land and money would be provided in 
compensation for the extinguishment would be decided by Congress after 
some consultation with Alaska Natives. In the end, the settlement has 
been praised by many in terms of the amounts of land and money 
awarded,118 but others have decried the failings with respect to tribal 
sovereignty and protection of hunting, fishing, and gathering rights.119 
Preparations for the settlement began in earnest in the mid-1960s, and a 
comparison of the opening proposal with the final outcome reveals some 
of the strengths and weaknesses of the settlement. 
Alaska Native villages and regional organizations mobilized to halt 
the transfer of land to the State of Alaska under the Statehood Act before 
1966, and in that year came together to form the Alaska Federation of 
Natives (AFN).120 At the initial AFN convention, 250 representatives met 
and appointed a land claims committee to deal with the increasing 
pressure toward settlement. It was at the second meeting of the AFN in 
1967 that representatives of the Governor of Alaska appeared and 
proposed that the Native community and State work together.121 An 
 
 115. See, e.g., Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994) (considering the effect of a 
federal statute that unilaterally removed land from the Uintah Indian 
reservation). 
 116. See HENSLEY, supra note 21, at 134–45 (describing Native organization and 
mobilization in Washington, D.C. and Alaska to assert land claims). 
 117. See BERRY, supra note 81, at 123. 
 118. CHARLES F. WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN INDIAN 
NATIONS 235–36 (1st ed. 2005). See DONALD C. MITCHELL, TAKE MY LAND TAKE MY 
LIFE 10 (2001) (characterizing the settlement as “the most generous and innovative 
land claim settlement in U.S. history”). It is hard to agree that the Settlement was 
so great in every way. The loss of aboriginal hunting and fishing rights with no 
replacement, and the loss of tribal sovereignty over Indian country per the Venetie 
ruling have long-term value that is impossible to calculate. See infra Part III. 
 119. See WILKINSON, supra note 118, at 239 (asserting that ANCSA was 
“termination in disguise”). See generally THOMAS R. BERGER, VILLAGE JOURNEY: THE 
REPORT OF THE ALASKA NATIVE REVIEW COMMISSION (1st ed. 1985) (sharply 
criticizing the Settlement and suggesting alternatives based on extensive field 
research and interviews with Alaska Native people and others with expertise). 
 120. ARNOLD, supra note 31, at 108–15. 
 121. Id. at 119. 
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Alaska Native Claims Task Force, chaired by State Representative Willie 
Hensley, and composed of Native leaders, state government leaders, and 
representatives of the DOI, was formed at the meeting. In 1968, the Task 
Force recommended a three-pronged settlement that included forty 
million acres of land, money and continued use of traditional lands for 
hunting, fishing and gathering activities. Task Force Chairman Willie 
Hensley presented the Task Force’s findings to Congress in 1968 and 
explained the unique and yet  diverse nature of Alaska’s Indigenous 
peoples and their claims, but noted that “we all basically agree on the 
major objectives in the land settlement.”122 
The Report that Chairman Hensley submitted reflected an approach 
different in many ways from the traditional reservation model used in the 
contiguous forty-eight states, but provided the same basic elements—
land, monetary compensation, and protection for traditional activities. 
Chairman Hensley’s testimony also carried a message of self-
determination in that it called for Native management of lands reserved 
in Native ownership, and for any federal role to be informed by Native 
representation.123 
A REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE ON NATIVE LAND 
CLAIMS 
JUNEAU, JANUARY 10-16, 1968 
HON. WALTER J. HICKEL, 
Governor of Alaska: 
Your Task Force proposes a four-part settlement of the 
Native land claim question, consisting of- 
(a) A grant of 40 million acres of land in fee, or in trust, to 
village groups (compared to the 102.5 million acres given the 
state of Alaska under the Statehood Act, or the much larger area 
encompassed in the Native claims) allocated among the villages 
in proportion to the number of persons on their rolls. 
(b)  A grant of 10% royalty interest in outer continental shelf 
revenues, along the lines proposed by Secretary Udall, in lieu of 
 
 122. Alaska Native Land Claims: Hearing on H.R. 11213, H.R. 15049 and H.R. 17129 
Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the H. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 
90th Cong. 117 (1968) [hereinafter Alaska Native Land Claims Hearing] (statement of 
Hon. Willie Hensley, Representative in the Alaska Legislature from the 17th 
District, Kotzbue, Alaska). 
 123. Id. at 118 (“The task force desires a simplification of the administrative 
process. The powers of the Secretary of the Interior should be limited and controls 
over land, if necessary, be located in Alaska with native representation.”). 
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the right to compensation for lands reserved or disposed of to 
third parties, with an immediate advance payment of 
$20,000,000 by the Federal Government. 
(c) A grant by the State of 5% royalty interest in state 
selected lands, tidelands, and submerged lands, but excluding 
current revenue sources from the state lands (in order to avoid 
direct impact on the general fund) and commencing only upon 
lifting the land freeze and resumption of state selection. 
(d) A terminable license to use the surface of lands under 
occupancy and used by Natives.124 
 These general recommendations were followed by draft 
implementing language that detailed the way in which the corporation 
lands would be allocated. For example, the township grant section (a) 
anticipated the population formula adopted in ANCSA, but whereas 
ANCSA provided only surface rights to the village, the proposal provided 
for surface and subsurface rights.125 In addition, village land grants could 
be held as “village-as-incorporated-tribal group[s].”126 Further, the 
village would have the option of whether to receive the grant in fee or in 
trust.127 If in trust, the village could choose the Secretary of the Interior as 
trustee, or subject to his concurrence, could “appoint any other person, 
including a regional or statewide Native corporation as trustee.”128 The 
revenue sharing sections (b) & (c) would have been implemented through 
federal contirbutions of at least $65,000,000 over twenty-five years, while 
the state royalty would have been perpetual.129 The terminable license 
provision (d) would have allowed for continued, but permissive, 
permissive use of federal lands for up to 100 years for hunting fishing and 
gathering by Alaska Natives.130 
The combined references to fee or trust lands for incorporated “tribal 
groups” could have led to an option under ANCSA that would have 
 
 124. Id. at 119. 
 125. Id. at 120. 
 126. Id. These incorporated tribal groups would have been limited to Alaska 
Natives who would become corporate shareholders with stock ownership limited 
to the original holder, and for 100 years to the descendants of original stock 
recipients. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129.  Id. at 120-121. 
 130.  Id. at 121. H.R. 11213, § 401 which had been transmitted and introduced 
at the request of the Secretary of the Interior in 1967, contained the use and 
occupancy provision.  See Letter from Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall to 
Hon. Wayne N. Aspinall (April 30, 1968), reprinted in Alaska Native Land Claims 
Hearing, supra note 122 at 72-74. 
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allowed villages to maintain land that would be considered “Indian 
country” under federal law.131 Other statements in the record at this point, 
however, demonstrated a clear tilt toward some form of corporation 
system, motivated most clearly by animosity toward the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs (BIA).132 At the time, the BIA was known for its paternalism, 
which many tribes and individual tribal citizens found offensive and 
counterproductive to improving their economic and social status.133 In 
any event, the die was cast, and the “administrative mechanism” for the 
settlement would be corporations of some sort.134 At the same time, there 
was no discussion of the role of Native tribes as governments in the 
villages. 
ANCSA completely accomplished the objectives of the State of 
Alaska and the oil companies in the first operative section of the Act. It 
extinguished aboriginal title and any claims based on aboriginal title and 
also expressly extinguished “any aboriginal hunting and fishing rights 
that may exist.”135 In exchange, Alaska Natives born by December 18, 
1971, were to become stockholders in one of thirteen regional 
corporations and in one of more than 200 village corporations, according 
to their place of residence or origin.136 The monetary settlement was 
perceived as large: nearly a billion dollars to the corporations to be shared 
pursuant to a complicated formula.137 
The corporations as a group were entitled to receive approximately 
forty million acres of land.138 The quantity of land achieved thus matched 
the amount suggested in the 1968 Task Force Report, but there was no 
option related to holding the land in some form of a federal trust as 
 
 131. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012) (defining reservations as “Indian country” and 
trust lands held by the Secretary of the Interior as treated as the legal equivalent). 
See United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634 (1978) (holding that treatment of land as 
Indian country is necessary for a tribe occupying the land to take advantage of 
general federal Indian law principles that permit exercise of jurisdiction over non-
tribe members and most immunities from state law). 
 132. Alaska Native Land Claims Hearing, supra note 122, at 134 (statement of 
Barry W. Jackson, Alaska Federation of Natives) (“Now, we are trying to get away 
from the BIA, frankly, and from the Secretary of the Interior and accomplish a 
transition into American society.”). But see supra notes 57–66 and accompanying 
text. 
 133. See generally Kevin Gover, An Indian Trust for the Twenty-first Century, 46 
NAT. RESOURCES J. 317 (2006). 
 134. Alaska Native Land Claims Hearing, supra note 122, at 133 (statement of 
Barry W. Jackson, Federation of Alaska Natives) (describing effort to develop “a 
proposal that perhaps all could accept, that all could live with”). 
 135. 43 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (2012). See Inupiat Comm. of the Arctic Slope v. United 
States, 680 F.2d 122, 129 (1982) (right to sue for trespass damages extinguished). 
 136. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1606–1607. 
 137. 43 U.S.C. § 1605(a). 
 138. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 12, § 4.07[3][b][ii][B], at 332–33. 
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suggested in the Report delivered to Congress, and the Supreme Court 
made it clear that the omission (coupled with the express revocation of all 
reservations, save Metlakatla) extinguished the “Indian country” status 
of land conveyed pursuant to ANCSA.139 The inherent powers of self-
governance over members and territory had been acknowledged in a 
number of ways,140 and there is no evidence that Congress intended to 
extinguish them. 
Why was ANCSA silent on such a critical matter? The remote 
locations of Native villages and the relative lack of non-Native 
encroachment best explains the lack of concern for expressly securing 
rights of self-government. As explained by the chairman of the 1968 
Governor’s Task Force Report, Willie Hensley: 
Our focus was on land. Land was our future, our survival. In my 
region all we wanted was to get control of our space so we could 
live on it and hunt and fish on it and make our own way into the 
twentieth century at our own pace. Our focus was on land not 
structure. The vehicle for administering the land was not our 
focus. We weren’t lawyers. We were battling the state tooth and 
tong. We were always afraid the President might create a 
pipeline corridor. We were afraid of failure, or not getting a 
settlement and not protecting the land for our future 
generations. As a minority group we knew we could only press 
the country so far. But none of us ever envisioned a loss of tribal 
structure. We never thought the tribal control would not 
continue.141 
In addition, federal policy had not yet moved completely out of the 
termination era that took hold in the 1950s. Senator Henry Jackson, a key 
player in ANCSA’s development, had an “antipathy toward Indian 
reservations in general and Alaska reservations in particular.”142 Thus, 
 
 139. Alaska v. Native Vill. Of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520 (1998). But see 
Andy Harrington, Whatever Happened to the Seveloff Fix, 32 ALASKA L. REV. 32 (2015) 
(arguing that “Indian country” federal law regarding liquor extends to the Alaska 
Native Villages). 
 140. See Aboriginal Fishing Rights in Alaska, 57 Interior Dec. 461, 474 (1942); 
Validity of Marriage by Custom Among the Natives or Indians of Alaska, 54 
Interior Dec. 39 (1932); 25 U.S.C. § 5119 (2012) (application of the IRA to Alaska); 
In re McCord, 151 F. Supp. 132 (D. Alaska 1957); 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (application of 
Public Law 280 authorizing state jurisdiction over offenses committed in “Indian 
country” in Alaska). 
 141. WILKINSON, supra note 118, at 238–39 (quoting Willie Hensley). See also 
HENSLEY, supra note 21, chs. 16–17 (describing land claims negotiation process 
from a first-hand perspective). 
 142.  WILKINSON, supra note 118, at 238. See generally MARK N. TRAHANT, THE 
LAST GREAT BATTLE OF THE INDIAN WARS (2010) (describing Senator Jackson’s role 
in the termination policy era). 
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instead of providing a local option of receiving settlement lands in either 
trust or fee lands as set out in the 1968 Task Force Report,143 ANCSA 
revoked all existing reservations (save Metlakatla).144 The latter action can 
be viewed as consistent with the theme of distancing the Secretary of the 
Interior from a paternalistic supervisory position with respect to land, but 
is not necessarily inconsistent with fee simple ownership of land and 
continued existence of substantial aspects of tribal sovereignty.145 The 
perceived problem with reservations is that once land is held in trust (or 
reservation status), the federal restriction on alienation protects the land 
from not only involuntary loss, but also from most leasing or other short 
term transfers without federal approval.146 Until recently, most tribes 
could only lease their land with the approval of the Secretary of the 
Interior, and even then only for a twenty-five year term.147 The 
paternalism inherent in a regime where the BIA acts as trustee was 
abhorrent to many Alaska Natives.148 The trust status frees the land from 
state and local taxation, and most other state or local regulation such as 
zoning.149 Trust status is also essential for the exercise of tribal territorial 
jurisdiction over non-members of the tribe.150 
It is understandable that Native leadership at the time would not 
have seriously considered that settlement of land claims necessarily 
diminished the authority of Native tribal governments. There were over 
seventy villages organized under the IRA at the time, and most others 
operated under some form of traditional council governance.151 ANCSA 
did not speak at all to their continued existence and federal law made it 
quite clear that tribal powers of self-governance survive until expressly 
 
 143. See supra notes 122–128 and accompanying text. Trust lands are generally 
viewed as being the equivalent of Indian reservations, as both are treated as 
“Indian country” where federal and tribal law are generally applicable, and state 
law often does not apply. See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 
114, 125 (1993). 
 144. 43 U.S.C. § 1618 (2012). 
 145. For example, historic Pueblo Indian lands are held in fee simple, but have 
been treated as Indian country subject to tribal jurisdiction. See COHEN’S 
HANDBOOK, supra note 12, § 4.07[3][b][ii][C], at 334–35. The lands of the New York 
tribes are not held in trust, but as restricted fee lands. The New York Indians, 72 
U.S. 761 (1867). In both of these instances, it must be conceded that Congress had 
included the land at issue within the terms of the Indian country statute (as in the 
case of the Pueblos), or promised by treaty that land would not be taxable. See id.; 
COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 12, § 4.07[3][b][ii][C], at 334–35. 
 146. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2012). 
 147. Id. at § 415(a). 
 148. See supra notes 131–133 and accompanying text. 
 149. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 12, § 6.04[3][b] (discussing the limits 
of state civil regulation provided under Public Law 280). 
 150.  Id. at 184-185, 211-212. 
 151. CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 9, at 329–30. 
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extinguished by Congress.152 As discussed below, the Supreme Court 
flipped that presumption in the Venetie litigation and severely 
undermined tribal territorial jurisdiction.153 
III. ANCSA’S CHANGING STRUCTURE: SOVEREIGNTY AND 
SUBSISTENCE 
The forty-five years since ANCSA have seen a major restructuring of 
the Act through amendments adopted by nearly every Congress for the 
following thirty-five years.154 The major change came when the Native 
community persuaded Congress in 1988 to indefinitely extend the federal 
restrictions on the sale of corporate stock, which were set to expire in 
1991.155 Congress explained in its findings that “Natives have differing 
opinions as to whether the Native Corporation, as originally structured 
by the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, is well adapted to the reality 
of life in Native villages and to the continuation of traditional Native 
cultural values . . . .”156 At that point, the notion that the federal 
government would somehow terminate its involvement with the Native 
corporations died. Other amendments to ANCSA provided for protection 
from state and local taxation, and certain forms of involuntary loss.157 
Congress had not spoken at all directly to the status of Alaska Native 
tribes with the notable exception of confirming their status as federal 
 
 152. See Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2032 (2014) 
(“[C]ourts will not lightly assume that Congress in fact intends to undermine 
Indian self-government . . .”); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 
(1978) (refusing to imply limitations to tribal sovereignty in the absence of clear 
expressions of Congressional intent). 
 153. See infra Part III.B. (discussing Alaska Supreme Court cases recognizing 
tribal jurisdiction over non-members). 
 154. CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 9, at 165. 
 155. Act of Feb. 3, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-241, 101 Stat. 1788; 43 U.S.C. §§ 1606(h), 
1607(c) (2012). The federal securities law exemptions were similarly continued. 43 
U.S.C. § 1625; see Jimerson v. Tetlin Native Corp., 144 P.3d 470, 474 (Alaska 2006) 
(holding that “no exception applies for transfer of ANCSA stock back to a Native 
corporation in exchange for stock in a newly created corporation”). 
 156. Act of Feb. 3, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-241, § 2(4), 101 Stat. 1788. The Senate 
Report elaborated on dissatisfaction with parts of ANCSA: 
In addition to the problems already discussed, a number of Native witnesses who 
appeared before the Committee testified that they and many other Alaska 
Natives, particularly those who live in isolated rural villages who participate in 
the subsistence hunting, fishing and gathering economy, feel that the social and 
human values embodied in the corporate form of organization frequently conflict 
with traditional Native values and Alaska’s traditional Native cultures. 
S. REP. NO. 100-201, at 21 (1987), as reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3269, 3272. 
 157. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1636(d) (automatic land bank protections for unleased 
and undeveloped corporation land). 
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recognized tribes in 1993.158 Since then, a string of court decisions, 
administrative actions, and congressional acts have confirmed of the 
status of Alaska Native tribes and their governmental powers. Congress 
addressed subsistence uses in a number of statutes, but the primary 
vehicle for protecting subsistence uses, Title VIII of the Alaska National 
Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA), has failed. This section 
examines the developments in these two areas after ANCSA’s 
extinguishment of aboriginal rights. 
A.  Hunting, Fishing and Gathering Rights After ANCSA 
ANCSA did not provide any statutory protection for Native hunting, 
fishing and gathering rights on lands important for subsistence purposes, 
though prior versions of proposed legislation provided some protection 
on public and Native lands.159 When the Senate and the House could not 
agree on the terms, all protections were dropped and the conference 
report simply expressed the conviction that “Native peoples’ interest in 
and use of subsistence resources” could be safeguarded by the Secretary 
of the Interior’s “exercise of his existing withdrawal authority” to “protect 
Native subsistence needs and requirements . . . . The Conference 
Committee expects both the Secretary and the State to take any action 
necessary to protect the subsistence needs of the Natives.”160 
Soon after ANCSA, Congress and the Executive Branch continued to 
afford federal protection to subsistence rights in a few areas, largely 
through exemptions from federal laws, or international treaties governing 
migratory birds or marine mammals. The Marine Mammal Protection Act 
of 1972 (MMPA),161 exempted from the moratorium on taking marine 
mammals any Alaska Native “who resides in Alaska and who dwells on 
the coast of the North Pacific Ocean or the Arctic Ocean,” if the taking is 
for “subsistence purposes” or for “creating and selling” handicrafts and 
clothing.162 The MMPA was amended in 1996 to provide for co-
 
 158. Federally Recognized Indian Tribe List Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-454, 
108 Stat. 4791; McCrary v. Ivanof Bay Vill., 265 P.3d 337, 341 (Alaska 2011) 
(describing federal recognition and Congress’s actions respecting Alaska tribes). 
 159. See H. Conf. Rep. No. 92-746, at 37 (1971), as reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N., 
2247, 2250. 
 160. Id. The President had the authority under the Pickett Act to withdraw 
lands for public purposes, which presumably could have included a withdrawal 
for subsistence purposes. Pickett Act, ch. 421, Pub. L. No. 61-303, 36 Stat. 847 (1910) 
(repealed 1976). 
 161. 16 U.S.C. § 1371 (2012). 
 162. Id. § 1371(b). See Beck v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 982 F.2d 1332, 1342 (9th 
Cir. 1992) (interpreting Native handicrafts exception favorably to Alaska Natives); 
United States v. Clark, 912 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir. 1990) (rejecting handicraft exception 
where a “substantial portion” of the animal was wasted); People of Togiak v. 
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management with Alaska Natives.163 The Alaska Eskimo Whaling 
Commission annually obtains subsistence bowhead whaling quotas 
pursuant to the International Whaling Convention.164 Polar bear 
management agreements and treaties also contain special provisions 
dealing with Native harvest,165 and regulations implementing the Pacific 
Halibut Convention provide for Native subsistence uses of halibut.166 
In 1973, the Trans-Alaska Oil Pipeline Act imposed strict liability for 
any harm to the subsistence resources of Natives or others,167 and the 
Endangered Species Act (ESA) presumptively exempted subsistence uses 
by Natives and “any non-[N]ative permanent resident of an Alaskan 
native village” from its coverage.168 The Secretaries of the Interior and 
Commerce issued an order requiring early and substantial consultation 
between federal agencies implementing the ESA and affected Alaska 
Native tribes.169 
The 1978 Fish and Wildlife Improvement Act authorized the 
Secretary “to assure that the taking of migratory birds and the collection 
of their eggs, by the indigenous inhabitants of the State of Alaska, shall be 
permitted for their own nutritional and other essential needs.”170 These 
efforts to protect Native subsistence access to marine mammals, 
migratory birds, and halibut in offshore waters were beneficial, but too 
limited in scope. Fish and game, which are critical for Native subsistence 
uses, were not generally protected and the need for congressional action 
was apparent. Dissatisfaction with the lack of protection for subsistence 
uses by Alaska Natives led Congress to legislate a subsistence preference 
for all rural residents of Alaska in 1980 via ANILCA,171 after it became 
clear that the state and federal governments were doing little to provide 
for Native hunting and fishing rights. 
 
United States, 470 F. Supp. 423 (D.D.C. 1979) (federal exception to MMPA 
preempts state regulation of walrus hunting). 
 163. See 16 U.S.C. § 1388. 
 164. See CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 9, at 276–78. 
 165. 16 U.S.C. § 1423c. 
 166. 50 C.F.R. § 300.65(g)(2) (2016) (“A person is eligible to harvest subsistence 
halibut if he or she is a member of an Alaska Native tribe . . . with customary and 
traditional uses of halibut.”). 
 167. 43 U.S.C. § 1653(a)(1) (2012). 
 168. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(e)(1) (2012). 
 169. DEP’T. OF THE INTERIOR, ORDER No. 3225, Endangered Species Act and 
Subsistence Uses in Alaska (Supplement to Secretarial Order 3206), signed Jan. 19, 
2001. 
 170. 16 U.S.C. § 712(1) (2012). 
 171. Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 
Stat. 2371 (1980) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 3111–3126). See generally COHEN’S 
HANDBOOK, supra note 12, § 4.07[3][c][ii], at 345–52. 
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ANILCA served as a partial substitute for the rights extinguished in 
ANCSA, providing a priority for subsistence uses on the “public lands”172 
by rural residents of Alaska.173 Although the rural priority applied only 
to public lands, Title VIII provided that the State could obtain 
management authority over subsistence on federal public lands, “if the 
State enacts and implements laws of general applicability which are 
consistent with, and which provide for the definition, preference, and 
participation specified in [ANILCA].”174  Anticipating the enactment of 
ANILCA, Alaska adopted a subsistence priority statute in 1978.175 
Although the preference was not initially restricted to rural Alaskans, 
regulations adopted in 1982 brought state law into compliance with 
ANILCA’s rural priority.176 In 1982, the Secretary of the Interior certified 
the state government to regulate ANILCA rights.177 As a result, “Alaska’s 
1978 subsistence priority statute became operative as to all state lands and 
to virtually all federally owned lands in Alaska.”178 
In a great surprise to all parties involved in the ANILCA process, the 
State of Alaska became legally unable to manage the subsistence priority 
for rural residents. The Alaska Supreme Court ruled that the State was 
disabled from implementing a “rural” subsistence priority by the equal 
access provisions of the Alaska Constitution.179 The federal government 
was accordingly forced to administer the subsistence priority on federal 
public lands—a job that it assumed reluctantly and only after protracted 
litigation. Federal regulations implementing the Katie John ruling on 
federal waters were adopted in 1999,180 and were challenged by the State 
 
 172. 16 U.S.C. § 3012(1)–(3) (2012) (“The term ‘land’ means lands, waters, and 
interests therein. The term ‘Federal land’ means lands the title to which is in the 
United States after December 2, 1980. The term ‘public lands’ means land situated 
in Alaska which, after December 2, 1980 are federal lands”). 
 173. See 16 U.S.C. § 3114 (“Except as otherwise provided in this Act and other 
Federal laws, the taking on public lands of fish and wildlife for nonwasteful 
subsistence uses shall be accorded priority over the taking on such lands of fish 
and wildlife for other purposes.”). See also 16 U.S.C. § 3111(1) (subsistence uses 
“essential to Native physical, economic, traditional, and cultural existence”). 
 174. 16 U.S.C. § 3115(d). Any laws regulating subsistence uses must be 
formulated with the advice and participation of regional councils and local 
advisory committees, which have the authority to evaluate and make 
recommendations on laws regulating such uses. Id. § 3115(a), (d). If the state 
chooses not to participate, the management obligations default to the federal 
government. Id. § 3115(d). 
 175. Bobby v. Alaska, 718 F. Supp. 764, 767 (D. Alaska 1989). 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. McDowell v. State, 785 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1989) (holding the rural priority for 
subsistence fishing and hunting unconstitutional under sections 3, 5, and 17 of 
article VIII of the Alaska Constitution). 
 180. Subsistence Management Regulations for Public Lands in Alaska, 64 Fed. 
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of Alaska on a number of grounds in litigation commenced in 2005, 
concluding in 2014 when the United States Supreme Court denied review 
of the Ninth Circuit decision upholding the regulations.181 
In general, the subsistence priority for rural residents has not 
provided adequate protections for Native hunting and fishing rights.182 
As noted in the leading treatise on federal Indian law: 
Since the state fell out of compliance with Title VIII of ANILCA 
in 1989, its statutory scheme maintains a subsistence priority in 
name, but not in substance, and is far removed from the federal 
standards. For example, the state has created vast non-
subsistence areas, and treats its subsistence priority as applying 
only to use of fish or game after capture, and not as allowing for 
traditional means, methods, and timing of harvest. These 
provisions are inconsistent with federal law. Thus it appears 
unlikely that the state will be able to reassume management 
without making major changes to its constitution and statutes. 
In the meantime, dual state and federal management continue. 
Apart from issues regarding the geographic scope of the 
regulations, however, subsistence users have brought few legal 
challenges to the Subsistence Board’s rules. There is widespread 
dissatisfaction among the Alaska Native community with the 
limited nature of the federal subsistence program.183 
 
Reg. 1276 (Jan. 8, 1999) (codified as amended at 50 C.F.R. § 100 (2016)). 
 181. John v. United States, 720 F.3d 1214, 1221 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied sub 
nom.; Alaska v. Jewell, 134 S. Ct. 1759 (2014). See also John v. United States, 247 
F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (upholding federal assertion of jurisdiction over 
federal reserved waters as “public lands” under Title VIII and adopting the 
opinion in Alaska v. United States, 72 F.3d 698 (9th Cir. 1995)). 
 182. There had been a great deal of litigation with most of it involving state 
efforts to limit application of the subsistence priority. See, e.g., Kenaitze Indian 
Tribe v. Alaska, 860 F.2d 312 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding state’s statutory definition of 
“rural” unlawful, as it was inconsistent with the plain meaning of the term); 
Bobby v. Alaska, 718 F. Supp. 764 (D. Alaska 1989) (striking down state seasons 
and bag limits for moose and caribou as inconsistent with the customs and 
traditions of a Native Village, and affirming that ANILCA precludes restrictions 
on subsistence uses by rural residents unless all other non-subsistence uses are 
first eliminated); John v. Alaska, No. A85-698-CV, slip op. at 2 (D. Alaska Jan. 19, 
1990) (Order on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment) (striking down state 
regulations that restricted subsistence fishing at a historic Native fish camp); 
United States v. Alexander, 938 F.2d 942 (9th Cir. 1991) (setting aside a federal 
Lacey Act prosecution on the ground that state law prohibiting cash sales from 
being considered subsistence uses was in conflict with ANILCA’s protection of 
customary trade as a subsistence use); Kwethluk IRA Council v. Alaska, 740 F. 
Supp. 765 (D. Alaska 1990) (striking down state regulations governing subsistence 
hunting of caribou in western Alaska as inconsistent with the customary and 
traditional harvest patterns of Yupik Natives). 
 183. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 12, § 4.07[3][c][ii][C], at 348–52 (footnotes 
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In a number of congressional oversight hearings, Alaska Native 
tribes and organizations have expressed their frustration with the way the 
federal subsistence priority has been implemented. At the United States 
Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee Hearing “[t]o examine 
wildlife management authority within the State of Alaska under 
[ANILCA] and [ANCSA],”184 Rosita Worl described the current situation: 
Forty-two years after ANCSA passed, and 33 years after 
ANILCA passed, neither the Department of the Interior nor the 
State of Alaska has lived up to Congress’s expectation that 
Alaska Native subsistence needs would be protected. Today, the 
Federal Government manages subsistence on federal lands in 
Alaska. The State of Alaska generally manages subsistence on 
state and private lands in Alaska, including private lands owned 
by Alaska Native Corporations formed pursuant to ANCSA. 
After more than 20 years of ‘‘dual’’ federal and state 
management, it has become clear that the State will not do what 
is required to regain management authority over subsistence 
uses on federal lands and waters. . . . We hope this Committee 
will recognize that ANCSA and ANILCA failed to provide the 
long-term protections for Native subsistence needs that 
Congress intended, and take the actions necessary to provide 
those protections.185 
Subsistence fishing and hunting provide a large share of the food 
consumed in rural Alaska. The state’s rural residents harvest about 22,000 
tons of wild foods each year—an average of 375 pounds per person.186 
Fish make up about 60 percent of this harvest.187 Nowhere else in the 
United States is there such a heavy reliance upon fish and game.188 The 
United States Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee recently 
held a Full Committee Hearing “[t]o examine wildlife management 
authority within the State of Alaska under [ANILCA] and [ANCSA].” 
Senator Lisa Murkowski began the hearing by stating: 
 
omitted). 
 184. Hearing to Examine Wildlife Management Authority Within the State of Alaska 
Under the Alaska National Interest Lands Act and the Alaska Native Claims Settlement 
Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Energy and Nat. Res., 113th Cong. 1 (2013) 
[hereinafter ANILCA Hearing]. 
 185. Id. at 50 (statement of Rosita Worl, Subsistence Committee Chair, Alaska 
Federation of Natives). 
 186. Id. at 17 (statement of Craig Fleener, Deputy Commissioner, Alaska Dep’t 
of Fish and Game). 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. (“Alaska . . . is unique among all the states in that our fish and wildlife 
are essential to our quality of life . . . .”). 
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[S]ubsistence is about a way of life . . . [for] our Native people 
around the State . . .  [and] to identify your, not only your 
cultures, but, really, your spirituality with your food source, I 
think, is something that is important when we talk about 
subsistence because it is more than just putting food on the 
table.189 
In testimony at the same hearing, AFN Co-Chair Ana Hoffman 
reported that in western Alaska, local residents harvest 490 pounds of 
wild fish and game per person per year.190 
As outlined above, Alaska Natives have some measure of protection 
for subsistence uses in specialized subject matter areas including marine 
mammal protection, whaling, reindeer herding, and migratory birds. The 
Huna Tlingit Traditional Gull Egg Use Act of 2014191 provides that the 
Secretary of the Interior “may allow the collection by members of the 
Hoonah Indian Association of the eggs of glaucous-winged gulls (Laurus 
glaucescens) within Glacier Bay National Park.”192 In recognition of the 
importance of subsistence uses, an amendment to the Federal Duck Stamp 
Act exempts rural Alaska subsistence users from the requirement to 
purchase a Duck Stamp in order to hunt migratory waterfowl.193 
Most subsistence activities, however, involve hunting for animals and 
fishing for anadromous and freshwater fish populations.194 Most of that 
activity takes place on land and water within Alaska’s legal boundary, 
which was where ANILCA Title VIII and state law mirroring Title VIII 
should have provided protection.195 As the United States interprets the 
“public lands” definition of ANILCA, about 60 percent of the water and 
land in the state is under federal jurisdiction for purposes of Title VIII.196 
This interpretation means that the 104 million acres of state-owned land 
and the 44 million acres owned by Alaska Native Corporations (ANCs) 
and tribes are not considered “public lands” under federal law.197 Thus, 
 
 189. Id. at 3 (statement of Lisa Murkowski, U.S. Senator from Alaska). 
 190. Id. at 34 (statement of Ana Hoffman, President/CEO, Bethel Native 
Corporation). 
 191. Pub. L. No. 113-142, 128 Stat. 1749 (2014). 
 192. Id. at 1749. 
 193. Pub. L. No. 113-264, § 4, 128 Stat. 2939 (2014) (codified as amended at 16 
U.S.C. § 718a(a)(2)(D)). 
 194. ANILCA Hearing, supra note 184, at 54 (statement of Rosita Worl, 
Subsistence Committee Chair, Alaska Federation of Natives). 
 195. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. Of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 547 (1987) (holding 
that ANILCA applies within Alaska’s legal boundaries, i.e., out to three miles 
offshore). 
 196. See ALASKA DEP’T NAT. RES., FACT SHEET: LAND OWNERSHIP IN ALASKA 
(2000), http://dnr.alaska.gov/mlw/factsht/land_fs/land_own.pdf. 
 197. Moreover, the Supreme Court noted that “[n]o lands conveyed to the 
State, to any Native Corporation, or to any private party shall be subject to the 
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no federal protection and only watered-down state protections for 
subsistence uses apply to these lands.198  
 It is more than ironic that Alaska Natives on their own lands have 
no federal subsistence protections—even though Congress directed that 
subsistence needs be taken into account in making selections.199 No 
wonder, then, that there is a significant call for federal reforms to 
subsistence management in Alaska. The Native corporations as 
landowners have the right to exclude others from those activities on ANC 
lands, but the management regime is governed by state law. Accordingly, 
there have been informal discussions regarding the assertion of some 
measure of regulatory control over ANC lands by way of a cooperative 
arrangement between an ANC, local tribes, and the Secretary of the 
Interior. While this is a sound policy proposal, it will likely require a 
change in the “public lands” definition to make the subsistence priority 
of ANILCA Title VIII applicable..200 
Congress’s broad authority to restore tribal powers over people and 
territory could be used to restore a measure of tribal territorial jurisdiction 
in Alaska.201 This could include recognition of Native hunting and fishing 
rights on Native corporation land, federal land, and even state land. A 
more conservative approach would amend ANILCA to provide that 
Native corporation lands are “public lands,” but only for purposes of Title 
VIII, or simply that subsistence uses by rural residents are the priority use 
on ANC-owned lands. A number of such proposals have been presented 
to Congress over the years.202 While there is clearly congressional power 
to accomplish any of the proposals, it will take increased political will to 
move forward. In the meantime, Native subsistence users will be required 
 
regulations applicable solely to public lands within such units.” Sturgeon v. Frost, 
136 S. Ct. 1061, 1071 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). Several ANCs 
participated as amici in the case before the Supreme Court, arguing that the 
federal government had no authority over ANCSA lands within National Parks 
or National Wildlife Refuges. See, e.g., Brief for Arctic Slope Regional Corporation, 
et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Sturgeon v. Frost, 136 S. Ct. 1061 
(2016) (No. 14-1209), 2015 WL 7625446, 2 (“ANILCA was not intended to regulate 
Native corporation (or State or private) property falling within the 
geographically-drawn boundaries of [conservation systems units]” (emphasis in 
original)). 
 198. The DOI recognizes a duty to consult with ANCs regarding matters 
affecting their lands and associated interests. See DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, 
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR POLICY ON CONSULTATION WITH ALASKA NATIVE 
CLAIMS SETTLEMENT ACT (ANCSA) CORPORATIONS (2012), 
https://www.fws.gov/alaska/external/native_american/doi_ancsa_policy.pdf. 
 199. 43 U.S.C. § 1611(b) (2012). 
 200. See Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, supra note 171. 
 201. See infra Part III. B., Section 1. 
 202. See, e.g., ANILCA Hearing, supra note 184, at 3 (Statement of Lisa 
Murkowski, U.S. Senator from Alaska). 
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to muddle through existing federal and state administrative processes to 
secure the best regulatory conditions possible. 
B.  Tribal Sovereignty and the Possibility of Trust Lands 
1. Alaska Native Tribes Are Federally Recognized and Have Governmental 
Powers 
 
ANCSA did not mention the governmental powers exercised by 
Native tribes in Alaska, so many assumed that those powers continued to 
exist, as would normally be the case under federal law. “Although 
Congress has plenary authority over tribes, courts will not lightly assume 
that Congress in fact intends to undermine Indian self-government.”203 
The Supreme Court, however, did not follow this rule when it held in 
Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government204 that land conveyed 
to Native corporations pursuant to ANCSA was not “Indian country,” 
and thus not territory subject to tribal jurisdiction under general 
principles of federal Indian law.205 The Native Village of Venetie held fee 
title to 1.4 million acres of land set aside for them as the Chandalar Indian 
Reservation in 1943.206 ANCSA revoked the reservation’s trust status and 
“[t]he United States conveyed fee simple title to the land constituting the 
former Venetie Reservation to the two corporations as tenants in 
common; thereafter,  the corporations transferred title to the land to the 
Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government (Tribe).”207 
Most federal restrictions on alienation were removed by the 
revocation of trust status, but Congress has—then and since—provided 
for selective protections for current and former ANCSA lands.208 As a 
general rule, when Congress decides to extinguish tribal property rights 
or governmental power, it must do so expressly.209 However, the Court 
found a clear intent to abrogate territorial jurisdiction over ANCSA 
lands.210 While this seems contrary to prior law regarding limitations on 
tribal rights, it is now the law. The Court concluded with the observation 
 
 203. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2032 (2014). 
 204. 522 U.S. 520 (1998). 
 205. Id. at 532–34. See also COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 12, § 4.02. 
 206. Native Vill. of Venetie, 522 U.S. at 523. 
 207. Id. at 524. 
 208. See 43 U.S.C. § 1636(d) (2012). 
 209. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 (1978) (noting Congress’s 
broad power to limit tribal sovereignty, but refusing to imply limitations in the 
absence of clear expressions of intent); COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 12, § 4.02[2] 
at 222–26 (“Tribal property rights and sovereignty are preserved unless 
Congress’s intent to the contrary is clear and unambiguous.”). 
 210. Native Vill. of Venetie, 522 U.S. at 534. 
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that “[w]hether the concept of Indian country should be modified is a 
question entirely for Congress.”211 After Venetie, Alaska Native tribes 
continue to exist, but without a territorial base upon which government 
power over non-members might be exercised.212 
The Alaska Supreme Court subsequently ruled, in John v. Baker, that 
Alaska tribes continue to have power over their members and others 
subject to their jurisdiction by virtue of a consensual relationship between 
the tribe and its members—an issue not addressed by the Venetie 
decision.213 The issue emerged in an action involving the Northway tribal 
court’s jurisdiction to modify a prior custody order entered by that tribal 
court. The Alaska Supreme Court faced the question of whether Alaska 
Native villages have inherent, non-territorial jurisdiction allowing them 
to resolve domestic disputes between their own members.214 Answering 
in the affirmative, the court first dealt with the question of whether Alaska 
Native tribes had sovereign status equivalent to that of federally 
recognized tribes in the lower forty-eight states.215 After an extensive 
review of the law regarding federal recognition of tribes, and the history 
to the federal-tribal relationship in Alaska, the court agreed with the DOI 
that Alaska Native tribes had been federally recognized.216 The court 
added that, “[t]hrough the 1993 tribal list and the 1994 Tribe List Act, the 
federal government has recognized the historical tribal status of Alaska 
Native villages like Northway.”217 After concluding that the tribes on the 
1993 list had federally recognized status, the court moved on to analyze 
the scope of tribal power outside of Indian country. It correctly noted that 
“Indian tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by 
treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of their dependent 
status.”218 It easily followed that a father who sought relief from his own 
tribal court in a domestic relations matter would be bound by that court’s 
 
 211. Id. 
 212. Alaska did not challenge the federal district court’s ruling that the Native 
Village of Venetie constituted an Indian tribe under federal common law. See 
Native Vill. of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska, 1994 WL 730893 (D. Alaska 1994). 
 213. 982 P.2d 738 (Alaska 1999). 
 214. Id. at 744. 
 215. Id. at 749–50. 
 216. Id. While it has sometimes been argued that the 1993 list was a “new” 
recognition of tribes, the court affirmed, “the Department emphasized that the list 
included those Alaskan entities that the federal government historically had 
treated as tribes.” Id. at 749. In other words, the listed tribes had always been 
treated as federally recognized and this was not some unilateral federal action 
“invented” in 1993. 
 217. Id. at 750. 
 218. Id. at 751 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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rulings.219 The fact that the mother was not also a member of the Native 
Village of Northway had no bearing on the outcome.220 
More recently, the Alaska Supreme Court, in Simmonds v. Parks, gave 
full faith and credit to a tribal court judgement terminating the parental 
rights of a non-member parent of a tribal member.221 In that case, the 
Minto tribal court terminated the parental rights of a mother and father 
of a child who was a member of the Native Village of Minto.222 The child 
was placed under the jurisdiction of the tribal court shortly after birth due 
to social workers’ concerns about her safety.223 After initial emergency 
hearings, the natural parents consented to continued third party custody 
of the child.224 The father, Parks, made several attempts to regain custody 
of the child, and participated in tribal court proceedings where he 
objected to the tribal court’s jurisdiction over him.225 At that point, Parks 
hired an attorney, who wrote a letter to the court arguing that the Native 
Village of Minto was not a federally recognized tribe and thus had no 
jurisdiction over Parks.226 
At the hearing terminating his parental rights, Parks was allowed to 
participate, but under Minto tribal court practices, his attorney was not 
allowed to speak. Instead of appealing the tribal court decision, Marks 
filed lawsuits in federal and state court challenging the tribal court’s 
jurisdiction.227 “The federal district court concluded that the Native 
Village of Minto is a federally recognized tribe and that the Native Village 
of Minto and the State of Alaska have concurrent jurisdiction as to child 
custody matters such as are raised in the tribal and state court 
proceedings.”228 After protracted state superior court proceedings and an 
initial appeal to the Alaska Supreme Court, the case returned for a second 
time for consideration of the issues of whether the tribal court had 
jurisdiction over the case, whether the court’s refusal to allow the attorney 
 
 219. Id. at 752 (“Because Northway Village’s status as a federally recognized 
tribe is undisputed and its adjudication of child custody disputes over member 
children is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal 
relations, its tribal courts require no express congressional delegation of the right 
to determine custody of tribal children.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 220. Id. at 760. 
 221. 329 P.3d 995 (Alaska 2014). 
 222. Id. at 998–1001. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. The attorney threatened to file a civil action in the U.S. District Court 
against the Native Village of Minto seeking injunctive relief and monetary 
damages. Id. at 1001. The attorney also advised Parks that he could ignore the 
tribal court order and engage in self-help to regain custody of his daughter. Id. at 
1002. 
 227. Id. at 1002. 
 228. Id. at 1004 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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to speak constituted a denial of due process, whether the failure to 
exhaust tribal appeals affected his rights on the merits, and whether the 
tribal court decision was entitled to full faith and credit.229 
In a thorough and well-reasoned opinion, the court concluded that 
“we will not allow a party to challenge a tribal court’s judgment in an 
Indian Child Welfare Act-defined child custody proceeding in Alaska 
state court without first exhausting available tribal court appellate 
remedies.”230 The State of Alaska also participated in the case and argued 
that tribes should not be entitled to the same sort of full faith and credit 
as other states’ judgment. The court’s response was curt: “[t]he State’s 
argument also fails to afford tribal courts the respect to which they are 
entitled as the judicial institutions of sovereign entities. We have 
previously emphasized respect for tribal courts, and this respect must 
inform our analysis . . . .”231 
In another domestic relations matter, the Alaska Supreme Court 
recently upheld tribal jurisdiction to determine non-member child 
support obligations.232 The question arose when the Central Council of 
Tlingit & Haida Indian Tribes of Alaska (Tlingit & Haida) brought suit to 
force the Alaska Child Support Services Division (CSSD), the arm of the 
state government charged with enforcing child support orders, to enforce 
tribal court orders to the same extent it enforces the orders of other states. 
The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) governs and 
authorizes funding for enforcement funds, but only if the state passes the 
UIFSA.233 Alaska adopted the UIFSA and included tribes in the definition 
of “state,” which subjects tribal orders to state enforcement.234 Similar to 
its losing position in Simmonds v. Parks, the state argued that tribal courts 
lacked inherent authority to adjudicate the rights of a non-member 
parent.235 The argument was rejected, “because tribes’ inherent authority 
over child support stems from their power over family law matters 
 
 229. Id. at 1006. 
 230. Id. at 1008. The court reasoned that “[b]ecause Parks failed to exhaust 
available tribal court remedies by appealing to the Minto Court of Appeals, and 
because none of the exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine apply, we conclude that 
he is not permitted to relitigate his minimum due process and jurisdictional claims 
in Alaska state court.” Id. The court adopted the exhaustion rule and exceptions 
provided under federal law. Id. at 1004–22. See also COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 
12, § 7.04[3], at 630–36 (“Where the Supreme Court has not yet clearly foreclosed 
tribal jurisdiction, however, the policies behind the exhaustion requirement itself 
dictate that tribal courts be permitted to first review the jurisdictional question.”). 
 231. Parks, 329 P.3d at 1010–11. 
 232. State v. Cent. Council of Tlingit & Haida Indian Tribes, 371 P.3d 255, 264–
72 (Alaska 2016). 
 233. 42 U.S.C. § 666(f) (2012). 
 234. Cent. Council of Tlingit & Haida Indian Tribes, 371 P.3d at 258–60. 
 235. Id. at 268–69. 
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concerning the welfare of Indian children—an area of law that is integral 
to tribal self-governance—the basis and limits of that authority are tied to 
the child rather than the parent.”236 
2. Indian Country and Trust Lands 
 
While the books are rightfully closed on the questions of tribal status 
and non-territorial powers, it appears that the territorial jurisdiction of 
Alaska tribes is limited to Native allotments, defined as Indian country 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1151(c), and restricted Native townsite lots, the 
functional equivalent of allotments.237 That could soon change, however, 
due to new DOI regulations regarding acquisition of trust lands, excluded 
Alaska lands until recently.238 In Akiachak Native Community v. Salazar,239 
the district court struck down the exclusion, and the DOI agreed that the 
prohibition was unlawful.240 The AFN, which had led the cause for a just 
settlement of aboriginal land claims, supported the proposed rule to allow 
land to be taken in trust in Alaska. In written testimony to the Assistant 
Secretary for Indian Affairs, the President of AFN supported the 
proposed trust lands rule, noting “ANCSA was a Congressional 
experiment to the settlement of aboriginal land claims of Alaska 
Natives, and has been amended over thirty times in both technical and 
conforming amendments to better meet the real needs of Alaska Native 
people.”241  The Alaska tribes should not be subject to discriminatory 
treatment in the trust land context due to ANCSA.242 
 
 236. Id. at 269. In the alternative, the court ruled that even under the exceptions 
to the presumptive rule against tribal jurisdiction over non-members when on 
non-Indian land, as under Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981), the Tlingit 
& Haida Tribes had jurisdiction in this case. Cent. Council of Tlingit & Haida Indian 
Tribes of Alaska, 371 P.3d at 272. 
 237. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 12, § 4.07[3][d][ii], at 354–56. 
 238. Land Acquisitions in the State of Alaska, 79 Fed. Reg. 76888 (Dec. 23, 2014) 
(to be codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 151). 
 239. 935 F. Supp. 2d 195 (D.D.C. 2013). 
 240. Id. at 203–11. The court of appeals determined that the controversy 
between Akiachak and the DOI was moot and dismissed the State of Alaska’s 
attempt to appeal as the State had brought no independent claim for relief when 
it intervened in the case. Akiachak Native Cmty. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 827 
F.3d 100, 102 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 241. Letter from Julie Kitka, President, Alaska Fed’n of Natives to Ass’t Sec. 
Kevin Washburn at 2 (June 26, 2014) (on file with author). The letter was 
submitted in the course of the rulemaking process. 
 242.  Id. Amendments to the Violence Against Women Act, Pub. L 113-4, § 910 
(March 7, 2013), 127 Stat. 54, restored tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians 
under some cricumstances, but disclaimed any application to Alaska tribes aside 
from the Metlakatla Indian Reservation. In a hopeful signal, that discriminatory 
provision was repealed by Pub. L. No. 113-275 (Dec. 18, 2014), 128 Stat. 2988. See 
S. Rep. No. 113-269 (113th Cong. 2d Sess.), see also, 18 U.S.C. § 2265 note. 
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Consistent with the comments of AFN President Kitka and many 
others, the DOI adopted a final rule that removed the bar on taking land 
in trust for Alaska Native tribes.243 Thus, it is now possible for Alaska 
Native tribes to petition the Secretary of the Interior to take land in 
trust.244 
The process is not terribly complicated, but can be time-consuming 
due to administrative backlogs or when a party seeks judicial review. The 
regulation provides that land may be taken in trust when the tribe already 
owns an interest in the land, or when the Secretary determines the land is 
needed to further tribal self-determination, economic development, or 
Native housing.245 Statutory authorization for trust land in Alaska is 
provided by the IRA.246 Any application for trust status will result in a 
notice being sent to state and local governments for comment.247 Final 
decisions by the Assistant Secretary are subject to judicial review under 
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).248 The BIA published a “Fee to 
Trust Handbook” that further explains the process and provides sample 
forms.249 
The substantive criteria for acquisition in Alaska (aside from 
Metlakatla) are found in the “off reservation” section of the regulation, 
which provides for greater scrutiny of the need for trust status based on 
the distance of the land from the tribe’s reservation.250 Because there are 
no reservations in Alaska aside from Metlakatla, it is not clear how this 
section would be implemented. But given the isolated character of most 
Native villages it would make sense to consider the proximity of the 
proposed trust lands to the village itself, allotments owned by tribe 
members, or Native townsite lots. 
Substantively, the Obama Administration’s decision has great 
significance. The Final Rule’s preamble notes that two recent federal 
 
 243. Land Acquisitions in the State of Alaska, 79 Fed. Reg. 76888 (Dec. 23, 2014) 
(to be codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 151) (altering the land-into-trust regulations and 
detailing the history of the adoption of the Alaska exception to the rule). 
 244. Id. 
 245. 25 C.F.R. § 151.3(a)(2)–(3) (2014). 
 246. 25 U.S.C. §§ 5108, 5119 (2012). 
 247. 25 C.F.R. § 151.11(d). 
 248. See Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 
132 S. Ct. 2199, 2210–12 (2012) (holding that a citizen alleging an injury due to the 
Secretary of the Interior’s decision to take land into trust for a tribe had standing 
to seek judicial review of the decision under the APA). If the decision is made by 
a lower level official, the regulations provide for administrative appeals before the 
action is considered final for purposes of judicial review. 25 C.F.R. § 151.12(d). 
 249. DEP’T. OF THE INTERIOR BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, ACQUISITION OF TITLE TO 
LAND HELD IN FEE OR RESTRICTED FEE STATUS (FEE-TO-TRUST HANDBOOK) (2016), 
http://www.bia.gov/cs/groups/xraca/documents/text/idc1-024504.pdf. 
 250. 25 C.F.R. § 151.11. 
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commissions recommend the enhancement of tribal powers and the 
restoration of Native rights in Alaska—including renewal of the option to 
create trust lands.251 It remains to be seen whether and how much land 
will be  taken into trust in Alaska, and thus converted into Indian country. 
The decision is discretionary, and so much will depend on the policy on 
such actions in future administrations. In addition, the land in Alaska 
Native villages is primarily privately owned due to ANCSA 
requirements,252 which provide for the conveyance of the surface estate 
title to individuals and non-profit organizations who were occupying the 
lands on the date that ANCSA became law. In addition, no less than 1280 
acres was to be conveyed to state-chartered municipalities, or to the state 
in trust for a future municipality.253 In some villages, the municipality 
may have been dissolved under state law, or there will likely never be a 
municipality because there is already a tribal government to carry out 
municipal government functions. Perhaps those municipal trust lands 
could be transferred to tribal ownership and then be converted to federal 
trust status if desired by the community. 
Of course, other sources of land might be surface or subsurface 
estates transferred to a tribe from a Native corporation.254 Essentially, the 
regulatory change opening the door to trust land status could result in the 
establishment of a significant amount of Indian country in Alaska. That 
territory will be subject to tribal authority and further advance the cause 
of Native self-government in Alaska. At the same time, however, the land 
taken into trust will likely be relatively small, and the time-consuming 
process may spark litigation as it has in the lower forty-eight states.255 If 
tribal governments are to exercise broad authority in village Alaska, some 
 
 251. Land Acquisitions in the State of Alaska, 79 Fed. Reg. at 76889. See also 
INDIAN LAW AND ORDER COMM’N, A ROADMAP FOR MAKING NATIVE AMERICA SAFER: 
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 33–62 (2013), 
http://www.aisc.ucla.edu/iloc/report/files/A_Roadmap_For_Making_Native
_America_Safer-Full.pdf; DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT OF THE COMM’N ON INDIAN 
TRUST ADMIN. AND REFORM 59–66 (2013), 
https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/migrated/cobell/commission/uploa
d/Report-of-the-Commission-on-Indian-Trust-Administration-and-
Reform_FINAL_Approved-12-10-2013.pdf. 
 252. 43 U.S.C. § 1613(c)(1)–(2). 
 253. Id. § 1613(c)(3). 
 254. Any transfer of ANCSA corporation assets may have to comply with 
applicable provisions of the Alaska corporation code dealing with the 
“[d]isposition of assets not in the regular course of business.” ALASKA STAT. § 
10.06.568 (2016). See also Jimerson v. Tetlin Native Corp., 144 P.3d 470, 472–74 
(Alaska 2006) (ruling that an agreement to buy out shareholders as part of a 
settlement of litigation challenging a corporate land transfer was unenforceable 
due to ANCSA’s restrictions on sales of Native corporation stock). 
 255. See Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 
132 S. Ct. 2199 (2012) (trust land decisions reviewable under APA). 
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federal designation of the territory subject to tribal jurisdiction that does 
not depend solely on trust land status will be necessary. This would be 
consistent with the situation in the lower forty-eight states where non-
trust lands are defined as Indian country if within a reservation’s exterior 
boundaries.256 
CONCLUSION 
Alaska’s non-indigenous settlement and movement toward 
statehood was typical of colonial expansion in the United States. The 
aboriginal occupants of Alaska had their rights to property and 
sovereignty diminished by the newcomers through the exercise of 
congressional power—without Native consent. The amount of land and 
compensation received by Alaska Natives in ANCSA has been viewed 
favorably. However, the failure to affirmatively recognize Native 
governmental authority over land, or to protect Native hunting, fishing, 
and gathering rights under federal law are glaring deficiencies in the 
settlement. There is reason for hope, however.  
First, the basic structure of tribal governance is firmly established as 
a matter of federal law. The door is now open to the administrative 
establishment of expanded tribal territorial jurisdiction because the 
Obama Administration revised land-into-trust rules that previously 
discriminated against Alaska tribes. Even so, the well-documented 
difficulties in providing adequate law enforcement call out for 
congressional action to provide increased tribal criminal and civil 
jurisdiction over all present in Alaska Native villages.   
Second, because Alaska Natives remain vitally connected to the land 
and its resources, there is a compelling case for meaningful protection for 
Native hunting, fishing, and gathering rights. The federal subsistence 
regime put in place by ANILCA has largely failed due to the State of 
Alaska’s refusal to cooperate in the regime it previously supported. The 
Alaska Native community has pressed both the Administration and 
Congress to provide greater protections for subsistences uses and there 
have been some, albeit limited, positive responses. Even more than in the 
case of tribal self-governance, the subsistence questions will require fresh 
legal and policy thinking, along with continued advocacy.  
 
 256. 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a). 
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But at the end of the day, it is most likely that the Alaska Native 
community will continue its efforts to advance hunting, fishing, and 
gathering rights, as well as tribal self-government. These efforts will aim 
to correct the deficiencies in ANCSA and ANILCA. Tribal self-
government and protection for subsistence uses should be protected by 
Congress in ways that accord with Native desires, values, and in 
recognition of inherent rights. 
 
 
 
